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Multidistrict litigation (MDL) is unorthodox, modern civil procedure. It is 
an old-but-new procedural tool that significantly disrupts decades of worked-out 
doctrinal equilibria—and, now comprising a shocking 39% of the cases on the 
civil docket, MDLs warrant more attention than they have received. The MDL 
puts a thumb on the scale of nationalism over federalism, consent over adversity, 
procedural exceptionalism over transsubstantivity, and common law over the 
Federal Rules. In other words, the MDL takes what has generally been the losing 
side of procedure’s big theoretical and doctrinal debates; it is a symptom of deeper 
pressures on the system to recalibrate procedure’s traditional baselines. 
MDLs are modern because they see the need for a national, not state-centered, 
approach to questions of procedure. They disrupt traditional legal relationships, turning 
judges and lawyers into collaborative partners in practical problem solving and creating a 
new judicial elite among the federal judges chosen to lead them. MDLs exemplify 
procedural exceptionalism—a type of litigation that judges insist is too different from case 
to case to be managed by the transsubstantive values that form the very soul of the Federal 
Rules. Instead, judges develop their own special MDL procedures—yet this new kind of 
procedural law is rarely treated as precedential or even subject to customary appellate review. 
 
† Professor of Law and Faculty Director, Solomon Center for Health Law and Policy, Yale 
Law School. This Article arose from ongoing research with four extraordinary Yale Law School 
students to whom I remain deeply indebted: Kayla Oliver, Nick Werle, Susanna Evarts, and 
especially Matt Butler. I am also most grateful to Judges Lee Rosenthal and Gregory Mize for 
helping me secure the judicial interviews on which this Article is based, and to Elizabeth Burch, 
Jack Coffee, Keith Ellison, William Fletcher, Lewis Kaplan, Alexandra Lahav, Emery Lee, Henry 
Monaghan, Judith Resnik, Eduardo Robreno, Sarah Vance, and many of the judges interviewed, 
for feedback on the draft. 
1670 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 165: 1669 
These deviations from the “textbook” have caused academic anxiety. 
Scholars worry about lack of transparency, loss of the individual claim, and the 
dearth of uniform procedural law. Many judges who try MDLs, on the other 
hand, view them favorably—often as the only way to ensure access to court for 
massive claims on a national scale—and also as highly enjoyable judicial work. 
This Article relies on interviews with MDL judges to offer a new set of 
counterpoints to the academic criticism. 
The Article also sets MDLs in the broader context of “unorthodox lawmaking”—a 
phenomenon documented in the legislative context but not yet in procedure. MDLs, like 
omnibus legislation and other forms of nontraditional lawmaking, are responses to 
pressure on the system, some way in which legal rules have not kept up with the obstacles 
of modern times when the consensus is that Congress and the courts must nevertheless 
take action. All of these unorthodox vehicles thus tend to operate outside the relevant 
rules, raising questions about the value of the rules themselves. They raise the question: 
What do we care about most? Is it access to court (or, analagously, the production of 
legislation)? Or is procedure for procedure’s own sake the more important value—even 
if upholding that value means fewer cases get resolved? MDLs highlight this tension. 
They are likely more symptom than cause of procedure’s modern challenges. 
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INTRODUCTION 
From the very first paragraph of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
(FRCP)—in which is set forth the goal of the “just, speedy and inexpensive 
determination of every action”1—it is evident that the system is anchored in a set 
of competing norms and tensions. The rules and doctrines of the field themselves 
may be understood as mechanisms to effectuate this constant mediation of 
tradeoffs. There is the structural tradeoff between federalism and nationalism, 
evident in procedure’s theories and doctrines of jurisdiction and choice of law. 
There is the negotiation between transsubstantive, or “one size fits all,” rules of 
procedure and rules that are instead tailored to particular kinds of cases.2 And the 
system struggles with the competing norms linked together by Rule 1, that is, 
between access to justice and efficiency. Through it all is a meta-debate about the 
value of the FRCP themselves as a system-organizing mechanism, and the 
process by which the rules are made—a process very different from what emerges 
when judges make procedure in common law fashion. To understand these 
systemic tensions is also to understand the institutional arrangements that the 
rules and doctrines of procedure have painstakingly arranged. Central to those 
arrangements are the horizontal and vertical relationships among the system’s key 
players—clients, lawyers, and judges (both state and federal)—who interact with 
one another, sometimes as adversaries, other times as peers and collaborators, and 
still other times as superiors and inferiors, in the more traditional hierarchies of 
the judge–lawyer relationship and appellate review. 
Enter multidistrict litigation. The so-called “MDL” is an old-but-new 
procedural tool that significantly disrupts many of these worked-out 
equilibria. The MDL is unorthodox, modern, non-textbook, civil procedure. 
It also may be a symptom of deeper pressures now on the system to recalibrate 
even more of procedure’s traditional normative and doctrinal baselines. 
But this does not mean that MDLs are rare, or even new. Born fifty years 
ago as the quieter sibling of class actions, the MDL has recently evolved from 
its initial purpose—to accommodate a rash of antitrust litigation against 
 
1 FED. R. CIV. P. 1. For a brief history of Rule 1, see generally Robert G. Bone, Improving 
Rule 1: A Master Rule for the Federal Rules, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 287, 288-300 (2010). 
2 Cf. Harold Hongju Koh, “The Just, Speedy, and Inexpensive Determination of Every 
Action?”, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1525, 1531 (2014) (describing cases evincing these tensions). 
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electrical equipment manufacturers3—into a more central procedural 
mechanism than ever imagined. Today, actions consolidated in MDLs comprise 
thirty-nine percent of open cases on the federal docket.4 Thirty-nine 
percent—a number that tends to shock even those law professors who 
teach procedure, because MDLs have attracted so little attention in 
academic work5 or the casebooks.6 The average number of pages devoted 
to MDLs in the leading first-year civil procedure casebooks is two.7 
MDLs are unorthodox because they are workarounds to the currently 
accepted baselines of civil procedure: the FRCP as preferred over common 
 
3 See Blake M. Rhodes, Comment, The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation: Time for 
Rethinking, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 711, 713-14 (1991). The MDL became a permanent feature in 
1968 with the enactment of what is now 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2012). 
4 Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Monopolies in Multidistrict Litigation, 70 VAND. L. REV. 67, 72 
(2017). Note that this number includes open cases; it is not thirty-nine percent of new filings per 
year. Some believe this figure overstates the share of MDLs on the docket, because each case in an 
MDL does not take the same amount of time as an ordinary case, and thus thirty-nine percent of 
the docket does not mean thirty-nine percent of judicial attention. But one judge I interviewed, 
while generally agreeing with that assessment, noted the possibility the thirty-nine percent figure 
might actually undercount, since some MDLs allow plaintiffs’ counsel to file consolidated complaints 
on behalf of multiple claimants, which means there may sometimes be more claimants than cases. 
5 The work of Elizabeth Burch is a rare exception. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, 
Disaggregating, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 667 (2013) [hereinafter Burch, Disaggregating]; Elizabeth 
Chamblee Burch, Group Consensus, Individual Consent, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 506 (2011); Elizabeth 
Chamblee Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 71 (2015) [hereinafter Burch, 
Judging Multidistrict Litigation]; Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Remanding Multidistrict Litigation, 75 LA. 
L. REV. 399 (2014) [hereinafter Burch, Remanding Multidistrict Litigation]; Elizabeth Chamblee 
Burch & Margaret S. Williams, Repeat Players in Multidistrict Litigation: The Social Network (Univ. of 
Ga. Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Paper No. 2016-04, 2016), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_iid=2724637 [https://perma.cc/J8GL-M9Q7]. Duke Law School has also 
held a number of working conferences on MDL procedure. See, e.g., Increasing the Number of Women 
and Minority Lawyers Appointed to Leadership Positions in Class Actions and MDLs, DUKE L.: CTR. FOR 
JUD. STUD., https://law.duke.edu/judicialstudies/conferences/apr2017/ [https://perma.cc/4YUL-9UAD]; 
Multidistrict Litigation (MDL) Conference, DUKE L.: CTR. FOR JUD. STUD., 
https://www.law.duke.edu/judicialstudies/conferences/may2013/ [https://perma.cc/V87D-E9VJ] 
(describing a May 2013 conference on the future of MDL). As this Article went to press, the academy 
began paying sustained attention to MDLs, including a panel focused on “MDL Problems” at the 
2017 Association of American Law Schools Conference. See ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCH., 111TH 
MEETING: WHY LAW MATTERS 43-44 (2017); see also, e.g., Andrew D. Bradt, Something Less and 
Something More: MDL’s Roots as a Class Action “Alternative”, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1711 (2017); Andrew 
D. Bradt & D. Theodore Rave, The Information-Forcing Role of the Judge in Multidistrict Litigation (UC 
Berkeley, Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research Paper Series, Paper No. 2828461, 2016), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2828461 [https://perma.cc/PL33-H3RE]; Alexandra 
Lahav, A Primer on Bellwether Trials, 37 REV. LITIG. (forthcoming 2017). 
6 See, e.g., OWEN M. FISS & JUDITH RESNIK, ADJUDICATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 
593-94, 596-98 (2003); JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 380-82 (11th ed. 
2013); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. ET AL., PLEADING AND PROCEDURE 320-21 (11th ed. 
2016); LINDA J. SILBERMAN ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 311, 979, 1111-12 (4th ed. 2013); 
STEPHEN N. SUBRIN ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 1074 (5th ed. 2016). 
7 See supra note 6. 
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law rules; federalism considerations; traditional institutional relationships; 
and—in the ultimate unorthodox workaround—MDLs are designed to avoid 
trial itself. Although styled as a mechanism for only pretrial resolution of 
cases unamenable to class action but with sufficient similarities to justify some 
consolidation,8 it is the worst-kept secret in civil procedure that the MDL is 
really a dispositive, not pretrial, action. MDL judges, unlike judges even in 
class actions, do not generally manage to trial or even to the possibility of 
trial.9 Only about three percent of cases remand to the originator (transferor) 
district judge; all others settle in or are resolved—for instance, through 
summary judgment—by the MDL court.10 That is a shocking statistic when 
one considers the mandate of the MDL statute itself, which provides that any 
MDL “action . . . shall be remanded by the panel at or before the conclusion 
of such pretrial proceedings to the district from which it was transferred.”11 
By all accounts, the statute’s idealized vision differs dramatically from the 
real-world practice of MDL. Indeed, most MDL cases are understood by all 
involved to be unamenable to trial at the outset. As one judge put it, “[i]t’s the 
culture of transferee courts. You have failed if you transfer it back.” 
MDLs are modern because they see the need for a national, not state-centered, 
approach to questions of jurisdiction and even choice of law. The way MDLs 
respond to this challenge also is emblematic of bigger forces pushing 
procedure in a multitude of different areas. MDLs are the product of the 
nationalization of the modern economy and a symptom of the lack of 
tools inside the FRCP to accommodate those changes. 
MDLs also depend almost entirely on consent and, in turn, disrupt 
traditional relationships among their players, turning judges and lawyers into 
deeply collaborative partners in (as one judge put it) “practical problem solving.” 
MDLs have created a judicial elite among the federal judges chosen to lead 
them, subverting the baseline premise of horizontal equality among federal 
district judges and instantiating Judge Richard Posner’s view that federal judges, 
with life tenure and little prospect for formal promotion, are eager to find some 
way to distinguish themselves from the pack.12 The MDL judge in many ways 
acts more like a modern administrator than the judge the FRCP envisions, not 
 
8 See 28 U.S.C. 1407(a) (2012) (“When civil actions involving one or more common 
questions of fact are pending in different districts, such actions may be transferred to any 
district for coordinated or consolidated pretrial proceedings.” (emphasis added)). 
9 Burch, Remanding Multidistrict Litigation, supra note 5, at 399-402 (“Multidistrict litigation 
has frequently been described as a ‘black hole’ because transfer is typically a one-way ticket.” 
(footnote omitted)). 
10 Id. at 400. 
11 § 1407(a) (emphasis added); see also Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & 
Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 33-35 (1998) (holding that § 1407’s plain language prohibits an MDL 
court from using the common practice of transferring consolidated cases to itself for trial). 
12 See RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 132-47 (2008). 
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least because, like agencies, the particular MDL judges who are chosen for these 
cases are delegated to specifically for their expertise in practical administration.13 
Finally, MDLs exemplify procedural exceptionalism. This is a type of 
litigation that judges insist is unique, too different from case to case to be 
managed by the transsubstantive values that form the very soul of the FRCP. 
Instead, judges develop their own special MDL procedures, often in 
collaboration with specialist lawyers, that build on previous MDLs or analogous 
actions. As a result, what has emerged is essentially a federal common law of MDL 
procedure. Yet, in another deviation from the norm, this common law is rarely 
treated as precedential or even subject to the customary judicial appellate review. 
These deviations from the painstakingly crafted textbook of procedure 
have caused academic anxiety. Many scholars worry about the lack of MDL 
transparency, the loss of the individual claim, and the dearth of uniform 
MDL procedural law.14 Some put MDLs together with arbitration as 
another mechanism that undermines trial and the traditional class action.15 
But of course, 99% of all filed civil cases today are resolved without trial.16 
The FRCP also now gives judges broad case management discretion in all 
kinds of cases and encourages a general managerial approach. My goal is not 
to convince the reader that the MDL is unique. Rather it is to present the 
MDL as a perhaps extreme example of developments in procedure that may 
tell us something about the modern pressures on the system, both in 
traditional cases and otherwise. These pressures are likely to produce only 
 
13 See Alexandra D. Lahav, The Law and Large Numbers: Preserving Adjudication in 
Complex Litigation, 59 FLA. L. REV. 383, 403 (2007). 
14 See, e.g., Robert G. Bone, Making Effective Rules: The Need for Procedure Theory, 61 OKLA. L. 
REV. 319, 339-40 (2008) (“[T]he MDL judge’s tactics undermine consent as a justification . . . . [and 
t]hus there is good reason to question the traditional day-in-court participation right.”); Howard M. 
Erichson & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Consent Versus Closure, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 265, 301-03 (2011) 
(noting the difficult problems of obtaining the “authentic consent” of MDL plaintiffs and that 
“lawyers overwhelmingly would prefer to obtain their clients’ advance consent to settlement”); 
Martin H. Redish & Julie M. Karaba, One Size Doesn’t Fit All: Multidistrict Litigation, Due Process, 
and the Dangers of Procedural Collectivism, 95 B.U. L. REV. 109, 110-11 (2015) (raising due process 
concerns); Judith Resnik, From “Cases” to “Litigation,” 54 L. & Contemp. Probs. 5, 64-68 (1991) 
(raising concerns about individuals in aggregated claims). For a more positive academic 
perspective on MDLs and mass tort aggregation, see Samuel Issacharoff, Private Claims, Aggregate 
Rights, 2008 SUP. CT. REV. 183, 214-15 (describing the benefits of “quasi–class action” litigation 
in processing mass torts); and Richard Marcus, Cure-All for an Era of Dispersed Litigation? Toward 
a Maximalist Use of the Multidistrict Litigation Panel’s Transfer Power, 82 TUL. L. REV. 2245, 2254-58 
(2008) (attempting to dispel the notion of MDL’s negative effect on fairness). 
15 See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Aggregation, Settlement, and Dismay, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 918, 
936-37 (1995) (“[W]e are witnessing the alteration of . . . individual adjudication—as it melds with 
‘alternative dispute resolution’ . . . and increasingly emphasizes settlement.” (footnote omitted)). 
16 U.S. COURTS, U.S. DISTRICT COURTS—CIVIL CASES TERMINATED, BY NATURE OF SUIT AND 
ACTION TAKEN 1 (2016), http://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/data_tables/jb_c4_0930.2016.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CC92-8BKP]. 
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more unorthodoxies over time.17 And in the MDL context, the 
deviations do tend to be especially far-reaching, with many judges 
adopting a discernable cowboy-on-the-frontier mentality that is not as 
apparent in other contexts. In other words, as the old saying goes, a 
difference in degree may convert into a difference in kind. 
However labeled, the view from the ground seems very different from the 
view in the academy. This Article relies on lengthy and confidential oral 
interviews of twenty judges (fifteen federal, five state), each with significant 
experience in MDL litigation.18 The federal judges who try these cases, and 
even some of the state judges who try parallel proceedings, are emphatic 
proponents of the MDL form. These judges describe MDLs as immensely 
satisfying, “roll up one’s sleeves” work. They find MDLs superior to class 
actions, in large part because they feel they are better “litigated,” even though 
they never go to trial. (This reveals another unanswered question: what does 
it mean to “litigate” in the modern era of infrequent trial?) What’s more, 
MDL judges resist at all cost imposing rules—whether in the FRCP or 
through uniform federal procedural common law—on the MDL process. 
This Article focuses on large MDLs, which the judges described as 
quite different from smaller ones. It is the unique pressure of managing 
hundreds, often thousands, of individualized claims in the aggregate that 
has birthed the procedural unorthodoxies that are the subject of this 
Article. To appreciate the scale of these large MDLs, note that the vast 
majority of cases on the MDL docket have been consolidated into a very 
small number of MDLs—in March 2017, for instance, 87% of cases were 
consolidated into only 18 MDLs, each with 1000 or more civil actions.19 
 
17 Cf. Pamela K. Bookman & David L. Noll, Ad Hoc Procedure, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) 
(discussing procedural legislation that arises, in ad hoc fashion, to meet new needs of particular cases). 
18 I am deeply grateful to all the judges with whom I spoke. I interviewed each judge in person 
or over the phone for approximately one hour. The federal judges were asked why they think MDLs 
are on the rise; how MDLs compare to class actions; how MDL procedure is made; about the 
relationship between MDL procedure and FRCP 16; whether a separate rule for MDLs would be a 
positive development or whether Rule 23 could be expanded to include MDLs or make them less 
necessary; about relationships among judges and attorneys in MDLs; about federalism and choice of 
law; about relationships and coordination among federal judges and between federal and state judges; 
about concerns regarding access to justice, transparency, the individual case, and lack of judicial 
review; how MDLs differ from non-MDL cases; about the role of consent; why they think MDLs 
are increasing; how they learned how to conduct an MDL; about the MDL panel and its process; 
about requiring state-court attorneys in parallel actions to pay into the common benefit fund; and 
about the low remand rate. Interviews with the state court judges included all of these issues but 
focused on the relationship between state and federal MDL cases that are parallel or consolidated. 
19 See U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., MDL STATISTICS 
REPORT—DISTRIBUTION OF PENDING MDL DOCKETS BY DISTRICT (2017) [hereinafter 
MDL STATISTICS REPORT BY DISTRICT], http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/
Pending_MDL_Dockets_By_District-March-15-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/T4AH-4ZMT]; see also 
DUKE LAW CTR. FOR JUDICIAL STUDIES, STANDARDS AND BEST PRACTICES FOR LARGE AND 
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MDL judges deny that MDLs undercut the individual case or individual 
access to justice. Instead, they argue that, without the MDL, the courthouses 
would be closed to the majority of cases that currently are consolidated. Thus 
the MDL, to their minds, is not the instantiation of Owen Fiss’s nightmarish 
world of settlement.20 Rather, it is the MDL that has brought these cases—whether 
it be the NFL concussion case,21 the BP oil spill case,22 the GM ignition 
switch litigation,23 countless drug cases,24 or other large-scale cases (that 
sometimes include multiple class actions within the MDL alongside individual 
claims)—into court for public resolution. It may not be the kind of resolution 
Fiss envisioned, but in the system we have, these judges say, it is the best option. 
One very experienced MDL judge put it this way: “Winston Churchill once 
said: ‘Democracy is the worst form of government except for all the others.’”25 
The judges are, of course, a biased sample. But they offer what might be said 
to be the “best case” arguments for the MDL, and so show academics critical of 
the MDL the arguments they must meet. The interview methodology was 
selected because there is relatively little academic work on the MDL and much 
of what has been written has been one-sided, skewed to the negative.26 (There 
 
MASS-TORT MDLS, at xi (Jaime Dodge et al. eds., 2014), https://law.duke.edu/sites/default/
files/centers/judicialstudies/standards_and_best_practices_for_large_and_mass-tort_mdls.pdf [https://
perma.cc/8U4A-ABPA] (reporting identical statistics for June 2014). 
20 Owen Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984) (describing settlement 
as a “highly problematic technique for streamlining” that “should be neither encouraged nor 
praised” since “although dockets are trimmed, justice may not be done”). 
21 In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. 351 (E.D. Pa. 2015). 
22 In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig “Deepwater Horizon”, 792 F. Supp. 2d 926 (E.D. La. 2011). 
23 In re General Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litig., 154 F. Supp. 3d 30 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). 
24 E.g., In re Xarelto (Rivaroxaban) Prods. Liab. Litig., 65 F. Supp. 3d 1402 (J.P.M.L. 
2014); In re Lipitor (Atorvastatin Calcium) Mktg., 997 F. Supp. 2d 1354 (J.P.M.L. 2014); In 
re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 360 F. Supp. 2d 1352 (J.P.M.L. 2005). 
25 See generally Winston S. Churchill, Speech at the House of Commons (Nov. 11, 1947), 
in 7 WINSTON S. CHURCHILL: HIS COMPLETE SPEECHES, 1897–1963, at 7566 (Robert 
Rhodes James ed., 1974) (“[D]emocracy is the worst form of government, except for all those 
other forms that have been tried from time to time.”). 
26 See, e.g., L. Elizabeth Chamblee, Unsettling Efficiency: When Non-Class Aggregation of Mass 
Torts Creates Second-Class Settlements, 65 LA. L. REV. 157, 208-15 (2004)(suggesting the Supreme 
Court “recognize[s] the potential for collusion [and unfairness] in settlements” of aggregated 
mass tort proceedings); Arthur R. Miller, Simplified Pleading, Meaningful Days in Court, and Trials 
on the Merits: Reflections on the Deformation of Federal Procedure, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 286, 297 (2013) 
(expressing skepticism that the benefits of “quasi–class action[s]” like MDLs “justif[y] judicial 
control over collective settlements and attorneys’ fees matters”); Linda S. Mullenix, Dubious 
Doctrines: The Quasi–Class Action, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 389, 422-26 (2011) (“The MDL . . . was 
never intended to . . . provide judicial cover for privately negotiated backroom settlement deals 
that do not comport with the rule of law, are subject to scant checks for abuse or due process 
violations, and that resolve the claims of . . . absent claimants. This, however, is precisely [its] 
legacy . . . .”); Redish & Karaba, supra note 14, at 110 (describing the MDL as “a cross between 
the Wild West, twentieth-century political smoke-filled rooms, and the Godfather movies”). By 
contrast, a project by the ALI has been more positive. See generally PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW 
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has been more scholarly attention paid in the specific, but limited, context of 
MDL settlement and attorneys’ fees;27 as a result, this Article does not focus on 
th0se two important topics.) Given the prevalence of MDLs and the desire on 
the part of many federal judges to preside over them, it seemed to this author 
that there must be a more positive side to the story. The interviews elicit that 
story and so outline the attractions of the MDL for the practicing bar that may 
not be captured by the academic literature. 
MDL judges have an outsized role in this area due to the vast discretion 
they have, making their perspectives particularly important. Their views 
flesh out the big-picture story of where MDLs sit in civil procedure’s 
overarching doctrinal and theoretical debates. MDLs are now sufficiently 
central to the system that, however unorthodox they may be, they deserve a 
place in the mainstream understandings of how our system really works. 
I. UNORTHODOX CIVIL PROCEDURE: MDLS AND THE  
WORLD BEYOND PROCEDURE 
Before going further, a word is warranted about the title of this 
Article—Unorthodox Civil Procedure. One way to look at the rise of MDLs 
is to see it from outside the field of civil procedure entirely, one of an increasing 
number of ways in which traditional legal structures have informally evolved to 
address pragmatic concerns of modern lawmaking that “textbook” processes 
have failed to address in a satisfying way. In previous work, I have chronicled 
the analogous rise of “unorthodox lawmaking”—Congress’s increased use of 
legislative pathways and vehicles that do not track the traditional Schoolhouse 
Rock! cartoon “how-a-bill-becomes-a-law” paradigm.28 Here, I suggest making 
the connection between those developments and the rise of MDLs. 
 
OF AGGREGATE LITIGATION (AM. LAW INST. 2010). For other exceptions, see also Issacharoff, 
supra note 14, and Marcus, supra note 14. 
27 For work on the role of settlement in MDLs, see Burch, Disaggregating, supra note 5, at 673-
79; Marcus, supra note 14, at 2277-79; Miller, supra note 26, at 286; and Margaret S. Thomas, 
Morphing Case Boundaries in Multidistrict Litigation Settlements, 63 EMORY L.J. 1339, 1349-73 (2013). 
For analyses of fee arrangements in MDLs, see Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Financiers as Monitors in 
Aggregate Litigation, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1273, 1283-85, 1295-97 (2012); Burch, Judging Multidistrict 
Litigation, supra note 5, at 109-15; Judith Resnik, Money Matters: Judicial Market Interventions Creating 
Subsidies and Awarding Fees and Costs in Individual and Aggregate Litigation, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 2119, 
2166-72 (1999); Charles Silver & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Quasi–Class Action Method of Managing 
Multidistrict Litigations: Problems and a Proposal, 63 VAND. L. REV. 107, 131-43 (2010). 
28 Compare Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An 
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725, 762 
(2014) (noting that in 2011 only 8% of laws passed by Congress went through the “textbook” 
legislative process), Abbe R. Gluck, Commentary, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding 
Congress’s Plan in the Era of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62, 96-99 (2015) (describing 
the Affordable Care Act as an example of unorthodox lawmaking), and Abbe R. Gluck et al., 
Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1789, 1799-1803 (2015) (detailing 
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Unorthodox legislative vehicles share features with MDLs. For instance, 
omnibus laws bundle bills that alone would not make it through Congress.29 
MDLs have likewise become vehicles to aggregate and resolve legal claims that 
alone cannot make it through the system. Newly developed mechanisms to bypass 
traditional, sometimes cumbersome, legislative procedures—such as committee 
consideration and the filibuster—find parallels in the ways in which MDLs find 
more efficient paths to discovery and claim narrowing, and bypass trial altogether. 
I have also chronicled, with Anne O’Connell and Rosa Po, “unorthodox 
rulemaking”: the analogous development of new mechanisms outside of the 
Administrative Procedure Act (administrative law’s analog to the FRCP).30 
These nontraditional administrative procedures help agencies implement 
modern, increasingly complex, federal laws in ways that are more flexible, 
more efficient, and less transparent. The link to the MDL should be obvious. 
To be sure, there are other procedural vehicles that could fall into this 
unorthodox category and that further substantiate the claim about the 
pressures on the traditional system. The rise of alternative dispute 
resolution, for instance, is another salient example. But even just focusing 
on the MDL, it seems worth noting that the various ways in which modern 
law is made—whether through big national litigation or through sprawling 
federal legislation—are developing in parallel. These common threads may 
signal that we are entering a new environment of lawmaking across the 
board. Indeed, such was the case in the late 1930s when, not coincidentally, 
we welcomed the FRCP, the New Deal, and the APA at essentially the same 
time.31 That was a moment for introspection about our legal system, its 
needs, and how it changes. This may be another. 
The Federal Judicial Center has extensively compiled MDL statistics,32 as has 
the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) itself,33 so only a snapshot 
 
many forms of unorthodox policymaking as “the norm rather than the exception”), with Schoolhouse 
Rock!: I’m Just a Bill (ABC television broadcast Feb. 5, 1977), http://abc.go.com/shows/schoolhouse-
rock/episode-guide/season-1/24-im-just-a-bill [https://perma.cc/T7HD-UJCZ]. 
29 See Gluck et al., supra note 28, at 1803-07. 
30 See Gluck et al., supra note 28 (detailing numerous modern administrative law 
workarounds, including the APA’s good cause exemption and use of guidances instead of 
notice-and-comment rulemaking). Of course, some of these workarounds are in the APA 
itself, raising the question of how unorthodox they really are. 
31 The FRCP was enacted in 1938; the APA in 1946; the New Deal–era roughly spans 1933 and 1939. 
32 See EMERY G. LEE III, SURVEY OF FEDERAL TRANSFEREE JUDGES IN MDL PROCEEDINGS 
REGARDING COORDINATION WITH PARALLEL STATE PROCEEDINGS (2011), 
http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/leemdlfedst.pdf/$file/leemdlfedst.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/DY3X-TZG6]; Caseload Statistics Data Tables, U.S. COURTS, 
http://www.uscourts.gov/statistics-reports/caseload-statistics-data-tables?tn=&pn=All&t=681&m
[value][month]=&y[value][year]= [https://perma.cc/K3YS-SD9N]. 
33 See Statistical Information, U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION, 
http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/statistics-info [https://perma.cc/9ENF-PEEE]. 
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will be provided here. According to the Center, the MDL docket has grown 
dramatically since its inception. From its launch through 2015, the MDL Panel 
centralized 400,000 cases.34 In early years, the “caseload was relatively flat—in the 
late 1970s and throughout the 1980s, the Panel averaged only around 40 
[consolidation] motions per year.”35 It was in the 1990s that the caseload burgeoned. 
As of March 2017, there were 233 pending MDLs.36 As noted, open MDL cases 
now comprise thirty-nine percent of the federal docket.37 My work on legislative 
and administrative unorthodoxies tells a strikingly parallel story about the recent 
increased use of unorthodox vehicles that make modern lawmaking possible.38 
In the legislation and administrative law contexts, I have argued that the 
theories and doctrines of legislation and administrative law are not set up to address 
the problem—or even the existence of—unorthodox lawmaking. The procedure 
context looks quite similar. For instance, the APA does not account for or establish 
any system of judicial review for presidential executive orders, an undoubtedly 
powerful tool of modern unorthodox lawmaking.39 Similarly, there has been little 
legal development of MDL procedural “law.” To take just one example, the meat 
of the MDL takes place in the pretrial context. But under current doctrine—28 
U.S.C. § 1291—pretrial rulings are typically not “final decisions” and therefore are 
not eligible for routine appellate review and the accompanying written decisions 
that would ultimately create MDL common law. If we want more accountability 
for any of these modern developments, we will need to rethink, or at least tweak, 
the traditional frameworks that we have erected to regulate them. 
Space limitations prevent more than cursory treatment of that next question: 
exactly how might doctrines change in the face of unorthodox lawmaking? But 
it is worth noting that doctrines already may be evolving. The Supreme Court 
in King v. Burwell, the 2015 challenge to the Affordable Care Act, acknowledged 
for the very first time that a statute’s unorthodox legislative process might have 
an impact on how it should be interpreted.40 The same year, in Gelboim v. Bank 
of America, the Court issued its second-ever opinion on MDL procedure, 
upholding the individuality of each case for the purposes of ripeness in appeals,41 
effectively making partial appeals of an MDL possible—precisely the kind of 
“tweak” in the name of evolution referenced above, a move that would increase 
 
34 Emery G. Lee III et al., Multidistrict Centralization: An Empirical Examination, 12 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 211, 218 (2015). 
35 Id. at 221. 
36 MDL STATISTICS REPORT BY DISTRICT, supra note 19. 
37 See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
38 See supra notes 28–30 and accompanying text. 
39 See Gluck et al., supra note 28, at 1860-61. 
40 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2492 (2015) (noting that since the Affordable Care Act did not go 
through “the traditional legislative process,” “rigorous application of [a traditional textual 
rule of statutory interpretation] does not seem a particularly useful guide”). 
41 135 S. Ct. 897, 904 (2015). 
1680 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 165: 1669 
MDL appellate review. Whether these cases are “one-offs” or the beginning of 
a more general conversation about how lawmaking has changed across many 
fields over the past fifty years remains to be seen. 
*       *       * 
This Article deliberately takes a 30,000-foot view, working in broad strokes 
rather than at the level of individual cases. The goal is to introduce students 
and nonexpert academics to the MDL, and to mainstream it in everyday 
conversations about the study of procedure—just as I have argued that, in 
courses and writings on public law, recent changes in the legislative process 
likewise must be studied, acknowledged, and understood as the new normal.42 
All of these modern unorthodox processes share common features. They 
each are a response to some pressure on the system, some way in which legal 
rules and doctrines have not kept up with the pace and pressures of modern 
lawmaking during a time when the consensus is that Congress, the executive 
branch, and the courts must nevertheless take action. They therefore tend to 
operate outside the relevant rules, raising questions about the value of the 
rules themselves and relying on consent rather than formal constraint, thus 
altering traditional relationships and often changing the balance of power. 
And with each of these deviations, the modern unorthodoxies raise the critical 
question: What do we care about most? Is it access to court—or analogously, the 
production of legislation or regulation? Or is legislative, administrative, or 
civil procedure for procedure’s own sake the more important value—even if 
upholding that value means fewer cases get resolved or fewer laws get passed? 
The MDL presses these tradeoffs. The MDL puts a thumb on the scale of 
nationalism over federalism, consent over adversity, procedural exceptionalism 
over transsubstantivity, and common law over FRCP. In other words—and this 
is what adds to its departure from tradition—the MDL takes what has generally 
been the losing side of procedure’s big theoretical and doctrinal debates. 
To the extent that one resists the scales tipping in that direction, the MDL 
may be more symptom than cause. If the system envisioned by the FRCP set 
the baseline, procedure’s unorthodoxies arguably began years ago, with the 
disappearing trial as just one example. The MDL simply illuminates, perhaps 
in more extreme fashion, already existing unorthodoxies in the traditional 
model. And yet, as in other contexts, what was once unorthodox can become 
orthodox in short order. For example, the concept of “Chevron interpretive 
deference” to federal agencies was novel when first developed, but today 
 
42 See, e.g., Gluck et al., supra note 28. 
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Chevron is the most cited case in the federal reports.43 The once-revolutionary 
notion of judges as case managers is likewise now entrenched in the FRCP 
itself and cloaked with the legitimacy of Rule 16.44 So too, it is possible the 
MDL may soon seem more like the baseline than the exception. 
II. NATIONALISM V. FEDERALISM 
One way to think about the recent rise of the MDL is to view its 
development through the lens of the more general tensions between 
nationalism and federalism in civil procedure. Procedure’s current 
doctrines of jurisdiction, choice of law, and class action all effectuate a 
relatively federalist view of the world that in some ways is incompatible 
with the modern concept of a nationally integrated economy. MDLs 
highlight and respond to that pressure by working around those doctrines. 
Look first at the current doctrines. The law of personal jurisdiction clings 
to antiquated concepts of territoriality and emphasizes state sovereignty. 
It still does not accommodate a concept of minimum contacts for 
jurisdictional purposes based on the premise that goods may be aimed at 
the United States as a whole (the idea of a national economy) rather than at 
a particular state.45 Justice Kennedy’s assessment in J. McIntyre Machinery, 
Ltd. v. Nicastro offers a recent and memorable iteration of this conclusion: 
“[P]ersonal jurisdiction requires a forum-by-forum, or sovereign-by-
sovereign, analysis.”46 As this Article went to press, the Court decided 
another case, Bristol Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California,47 
reaffirming its rejection of a conception of specific jurisdiction grounded in 
the fact of a national economy. 
With respect to choice of law, the Erie doctrine still reigns and is, of course, 
state-centered.48 Erie requires federal courts to apply the substantive law of the 
 
43 Abbe R. Gluck, What 30 Years of Chevron Teach Us About the Rest of Statutory Interpretation, 
83 FORDHAM L. REV. 607, 612 (2014). Recently, we have seen evidence the doctrine may now be 
unstable. Several Justices, including newly confirmed Justice Gorsuch, have implied the doctrine 
may be ripe for revisiting. See Philip J. McAndrews III, What SCOTUS Nominee Neil Gorsuch’s 
Interpretation of Chevron Could Mean for Environmental Administrative Law, GEO. ENVTL. L. REV. 
(Mar. 5, 2017), https://gelr.org/2017/03/05/what-scotus-nominee-neil-gorsuchs-interpretation-of-
chevron-could-mean-for-environmental-administrative-law/ [https://perma.cc/Pq8B-RB9R]. 
44 See FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (articulating standards for scheduling and management of 
pretrial conferences). 
45 For a rarely used exception, see FED. R. CIV. P. 4(k)(2) (allowing for personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant not subject to jurisdiction in any state). 
46 564 U.S. 873, 884 (2011). 
47 137 S. Ct. 1773 (2017). 
48 Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
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forum state.49 This requirement, in turn, makes many nationwide damages 
suits unamenable to class certification because federal courts tend to view 
these differences across state law as fatal to Rule 23’s commonality 
requirement.50 National litigation, then, has to look elsewhere. 
The civil procedure literature does not have nearly as much discussion of 
this nationalism–federalism tension as one might suppose. The existing work 
tends to be limited to the classic minimum-contacts teaching cases, such as 
Asahi Metal Industry Co. v. Superior Court of California51 and McIntyre.52 Those 
cases, however, do not concern the fact pattern that most often gives rise to 
the MDL. Instead, those cases concern where jurisdiction might lie for an 
international defendant who aims products at the U.S. economy. For decades, 
the Court has infamously failed to produce a majority opinion on that 
question and has never concluded that merely putting one’s product in the 
stream of American national commerce would suffice; instead, connection to 
a specific state is likely still necessary. 
Enter MDLs. MDLs offer an interesting twist on procedure’s 
jurisdictional chestnuts because many of the biggest MDLs involve American 
defendants. Thus the issue is not whether there is a place that the defendant 
can be sued. Rather, the issue in MDLs tends to be that the defendant can be 
sued in too many places.53 Although the MDL drafters may not have 
envisioned how pervasive the MDL has become, the statute from the start 
was indeed always intended to address this problem, namely, cases in which 
“massive filings . . . are reasonably certain to occur” in different jurisdictions.54 
A. The Race to the Courthouse: Horizontal Parity, not Sovereignty, Is the Issue 
One of the main problems MDLs aim to solve is therefore horizontal 
federal duplication and disuniformity. The typical MDL consists of damages 
actions across numerous states, resulting in cases being filed in potentially all 
ninety-four federal district courts (not to mention state courts). A 
traditionally federalist view might embrace the potential diversity—both 
procedural and substantive—that such horizontal proceedings are likely to 
produce. But from a national perspective, horizontal filings of this nature 
 
49 Id. at 78 (“Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of 
Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state.”). 
50 See Genevieve G. York-Erwin, Note, The Choice-Of-Law Problem(s) in the Class Action 
Context, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1793, 1794 (2009). 
51 480 U.S. 102 (1987); see infra note 52. 
52 564 U.S. 873. For examples of such work, see generally Geoffrey P. Miller, In Search of 
the Most Adequate Forum: State Court Personal Jurisdiction, 2 STAN. J. COMPLEX LITIG. 1 (2014); 
Stewert E. Sterk, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1163 (2013). 
53 See infra Section II.A. 
54 Lee et al., supra note 34, at 213 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 90-1130, at 2 (1968)). 
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raise concerns about conflicting duties for the parties and wasteful, 
duplicative efforts by the courts. MDL consolidation thus expresses a 
preference not only for efficiency but also for a kind of judicial self-protection 
that, in turn, advances the nationalization of litigation. 
Federal courts, beginning with Marbury, have always crafted doctrines 
with an eye toward protecting their own power and the enforceability of 
their rulings. Prudential rules, such as rules about finality and prohibiting 
advisory opinions, are all about the federal courts ensuring that when 
they speak, their mandates have teeth. In the MDL context, federal 
district courts have a similar interest: an interest in not having the rulings 
of one district judge undermined by the rulings of another. As one judge 
put it: “You need [MDLs] to prevent wars of jurisdiction. These conflicts 
are a nightmare. There is no ready mechanism for resolution, . . . [no] 
way to avoid whipsawing litigants and undermining judges.” 
Other judges emphasized the “real world” discovery challenges 
arising from multiple horizontal litigations, and how the MDL 
ameliorates those challenges. For example: 
The problem is discovery would be a nightmare without the MDL. Some 
judges allow certain documents and others don’t and the plaintiffs’ bar 
communicates every step of the way and would get the documents from each 
other they can’t get from the other judge. Judge #2 says they are privileged 
but now they are being used in the real world. 
Another judge reported: “It would be chaos if you didn’t have [MDLs]. 
If you had these cases all over the country, no one could comply with forty 
schedules, one witness can’t be deposed fifty times, it’s not fair to the 
parties to expose them to conflicting expectations so you need [the MDL].” 
Several judges emphasized how these practical concerns intersect with the 
federal courts’ general appreciation of “good case management”: “We see 
multiple cases arising out of the same issue with the same defendant in 
multiple courts. Let’s not reinvent the wheel in fifteen different federal courts, 
let’s deal with discovery in one place. That’s just good case management.” 
The way in which the MDL docket has evolved also supports the theory 
that the nationalization of the economy has been a driving cause of the 
MDL’s rise. Early MDLs focused on isolated incidents, such as airline 
crashes and “common disaster.”55 Prior to 1990, only six products liability 
actions had been consolidated into MDLs.56 As of December 2016, however, 
it was those very cases that had taken over the docket. Products liability 
 
55 Id. at 222. 
56 Thomas E. Willging & Emery G. Lee III, From Class Actions to Multidistrict Consolidations: 
Aggregate Mass-Tort Litigation After Ortiz, 58 KAN. L. REV. 775, 793 (2010). 
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actions had the largest share of the number of consolidated proceedings on 
the MDL docket, at 29.1%.57 Moreover, each product liability MDL tends 
to have many more individual cases consolidated within it than other types 
of MDLs, meaning that products liability actions dominate the MDL 
docket. Antitrust was second, at 22.5% of the docket.58 This shift is 
consistent with the understanding that modern MDLs are motivated by the 
way companies now do business on a national scale—and so the harm they 
inflict affects potential plaintiffs across the country. In the words of one 
judge: “We are in an era of mass litigation and mass marketing. Think about 
things like FDA warnings. It’s all en masse and when you have that, it’s 
about nationalizing litigation.” As discussed in Part IV, the nationalization 
is substantive as well as procedural: state-law and even federal-circuit law 
differences tend to get smoothed over when cases are consolidated. 
B. Evolving Procedure Doctrine for the National Context 
Could a more nationally focused set of procedure doctrines address the 
concerns that some find most troubling about MDLs? A more welcoming 
Rule 23 or something like a “pretrial class action” rule is unlikely to help. 
Although there is a good deal of commonality in consolidated cases, 
individualized examination is still almost always required. In personal 
injury cases especially, causation—and sometimes also damages and 
applicable state law—typically requires case-by-case evaluation.59 
A different response might be to apply to MDLs the same safeguards now 
applied to settlement class actions. It may be the case that such a designation 
would encourage more scrutiny and procedural regularity attendant to the 
final settlement, including a fairness hearing. But that type of scrutiny still 
would not change the “meat” of the MDL itself—the pre-settlement, 
information-gathering and consolidating phase. Moreover, some academics 
worry that incorporating aspects of Rule 23 would actually make things worse 
by giving MDLs an aura of legitimacy they believe MDLs should not have.60 
Similarly, shifting personal jurisdiction doctrines to embrace a more 
national focus—for instance, enacting a rule for nationwide jurisdiction 
 
57 U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., CALENDAR YEAR STATISTICS: JANUARY 
THROUGH DECEMBER 2016 11 (2017), http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/JPML_Calendar_
Year_Statistics-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/RA2G-LLLD]. 
58 Id. 
59 Cf., e.g., Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 622-25 (1997) (noting the problems of a 
“sprawling” settlement class stemming from disparate causation inquiries and differences in state law). 
60 See Linda S. Mullenix, Aggregate Litigation and the Death of Democratic Dispute Resolution, 107 NW. 
U. L. REV. 511, 539 (2013) (“[T]he harnessing of the settlement class device to MDL jurisdiction 
resonates in the back-room deal making, blanketed with an aura of judicial legitimacy and largely 
liberated from the due process concerns and protection associated with the class action itself.”). 
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(a possibility hinted at by Justice Kennedy in McIntyre61)—might not 
change much on the ground. Cases would still likely be transferred under 
28 U.S.C. § 1404 to a single jurisdiction. To be sure, that single 
jurisdiction would have the power to finally dispose of cases (unlike the 
MDL court, which, as a formal matter, has only pretrial authority62). But 
as a practical matter, the majority of MDL litigants waive their rights to 
return home for disposition and so the MDL court de facto already has 
this power.63 And even under a hypothetical nationwide jurisdiction rule, 
differences related to state law applicable to each transferred case would 
presumably remain, barring a significant doctrinal shift in choice of law.64 
C. General Jurisdiction as an Example of Modernizing Procedure? 
One area in which procedure doctrine has arguably modernized in 
recent years—and done so at least in part as a reaction to the expansion of 
the national economy—is general jurisdiction. A finding of general 
jurisdiction means that the defendant can be sued in that jurisdiction for 
any act committed anywhere (even outside the jurisdiction), since it is the 
forum in which that defendant is “essentially at home.”65 As most Court 
watchers know, general jurisdiction was essentially a static doctrine—it had 
been taken up by the Court only once after it originated in 195266—until 
2011. That year, the Court in Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown67 
embarked on what now appears to be a multi-case process of reviving, 
clarifying and modernizing the doctrine in response to current economic 
conditions.68 There may be something in this story for the MDL. 
 
61 See J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 564 U.S. 873, 885 (2011) (“In this case, 
petitioner directed marketing and sales efforts at the United States. It may be that . . . 
Congress could authorize the exercise of jurisdiction in appropriate courts.”). 
62 See supra notes 8–11 and accompanying text. 
63 Cf. Eldon E. Fallon et al., Bellwether Trials in Multidistrict Litigation, 82 TUL. L. REV. 
2323, 2357-58 (2008) (describing the use of litigant “Lexecon waivers” to enable the transferee 
court to “conduct fruitful bellwether trials”). 
64 See Ferens v. John Deere Co., 494 U.S. 516, 532 (1990) (holding a transferee court 
applies the transferor court’s substantive law); Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612, 642-43 
(1964) (holding that that following a § 1404(a) transfer, the transferee court must apply the 
substantive law, including choice of law rules, of the transferor court); cf. Klaxon Co. v. 
Stantor Elec. Mfg. Co., Inc., 313 U.S. 487, 498 (1941) (holding that in a diversity case, the 
district court must apply the choice of law rules of the state in which it sits). 
65 Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011). 
66 See generally Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408 (1984) 
(discussing Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952)). 
67 564 U.S. 915 (2011). 
68 See generally Meir Feder, Goodyear, “Home,” and the Uncertain Future of Doing Business Jurisdiction, 63 
S.C. L. REV. 671 (2014) (describing Goodyear’s “far-reaching effects on both the doctrine and theory of 
general jurisdiction . . . . cast[ing] doubt on a large body of lower court case law”). 
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The new general jurisdiction cases are modern because they actually 
acknowledge and strive to find a workable way to deal with the fact that 
companies like Starbucks now do business in every state. Before Goodyear, 
general jurisdiction was tied to the concept of territorial jurisdiction—a 
concept even more antiquated than the state-tied stream-of-commerce 
doctrine discussed in the specific jurisdiction context. Goodyear brings general 
jurisdiction into the era of the nationally—even internationally—integrated 
economy. Can Starbucks be sued for anything, anywhere, in all fifty states, 
merely because of its business reach? Or is there some more limited number 
of jurisdictions—some number between one and fifty—that is a better fit? 
Justice Ginsburg, speaking for the majority in both Goodyear and Daimler AG 
v. Bauman,69 the second case addressing this question, has strived to find a 
limitation.70 Justice Sotomayor concurred in Daimler to urge a more capacious 
view of the possibility of nationwide general jurisdiction: subjecting 
multinational corporations to general jurisdiction in each state in which they 
engage in continuous and substantial contacts.71 As this Article went to press, 
the Court decided a third case, BNSF Railway Co. v. Tyrrell,72 which closely 
tracked Goodyear and Daimler. Justice Sotomayor was again in dissent.73 The 
point is that the Court is grappling with how the law of procedure should 
react to how the economy has evolved, even as a majority of the Court has 
continued to resist a truly nationalized standard. 
It may be no coincidence that Justice Ginsburg also wrote for the Court 
in Gelboim, the Court’s second-ever opinion on an MDL procedural issue.74 
Although Gelboim did not address the nationalization theme, it did take a 
practical view of MDL litigation and might even be read as an MDL-inspired 
(albeit limited) update to 28 U.S.C. § 1291’s final order rule. There, the 
Court reversed the Second Circuit’s ruling that parties in an MDL cannot 
appeal an order if the order disposes of their claims but not all other claims 
in the consolidated action.75 Instead, the Court came down in favor of 
appellate review in the MDL context, holding that the resolved cases 
“become immediately appealable” even if the other remaining issues in 
the MDL would not be.76 Justice Ginsburg, of course, also authored 
 
69 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014). 
70 See id. at 760-61 (“Plaintiffs would have us . . . approve the exercise of general jurisdiction in every 
State in which a corporation engages in a substantial, continuous, and systematic course of business. That 
formulation, we hold, is unacceptably grasping.” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
71 See id. at 770. 
72 137 S. Ct. 1549 (2017). 
73 Id. at 1560-62. 
74 Gelboim v. Bank of America Corp., 135 S. Ct. 897 (2015). The Court’s first MDL procedure case 
was Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998). See generally supra note 11. 
75 Gelboim, 135 S. Ct. at 905-06. 
76 Id. (quoting DAVID F. HERR, MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION MANUAL § 9:21 (2016)). 
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Amchem, an opinion that merely acknowledged the existence of a parallel 
MDL (noting its formation was a response to judicial “lack[ of] authority 
to replace state tort systems with a national toxic tort compensation 
regime”77), but that likely precipitated the rise of future MDLs because 
it rejected the role for “judicial inventiveness” in bending Rule 23 to 
allow for a settlement class in a nationwide asbestos damages case.78 
III. THE FRCP V. A FEDERAL COMMON LAW OF MDL PROCEDURE 
How procedure should get made is another one of the field’s most central 
debates and one in which the MDL also intervenes unorthodoxly. The choice 
between the FRCP and judge-fashioned rules of procedure raises three distinct 
types of questions. First, there is the question of the way in which we want our 
procedure rules to be fashioned. Procedure rules can be made through the formal 
FRCP rulemaking process, by congressional statute, or by judges themselves. 
There are obviously different democracy and legitimacy implications attendant 
to which method is chosen, and judicial intervention has been generally more 
controversial than development through the formal rulemaking process. The 
most familiar recent example of how these choices play out is the development 
of the pleading standard originally set forth in Rule 8. As is well known to all 
followers of procedure, the Court significantly and controversially altered the 
meaning of Rule 8 through its decisions in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly79 and 
Ashcroft v. Iqbal.80 
An obvious corollary question to the choice between the FRCP (or a 
procedure statute enacted directly by Congress) and a judge-made common 
law of procedure is the extent to which uniformity should be the paramount 
value in considering how we make procedure. The assumption that a 
litigant can walk into any federal courtroom in the country and know that 
the same procedures will apply to her case is an animating principle of the 
FRCP (even if that principle is already significantly undermined, MDL or 
not, by the proliferation of local and individual chambers rules).81 
 
 77 Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 599 (1997). 
78 Id. at 620. 
79 550 U.S. 544 (2007). 
80 556 U.S. 662 (2009). 
81 Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 1 (“These rules govern the procedure in all civil actions and 
proceedings in the United States district courts.” (emphasis added)), and Charles E. Clark, Two 
Decades of the Federal Civil Rules, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 435, 441 (1958) (aspiring toward “the real ideal 
of a uniform and natural procedure for courts, both federal and state”), with Charles Alan Wright, 
Foreword, The Malaise of Federal Rulemaking, 14 REV. LITIG. 1, 11 (1994) (arguing variations in 
procedure from district to district have resulted in “procedural anarchy”), and Carl Tobias, Local 
Federal Civil Procedure for the Twenty-First Century, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 533, 553 (2002) 
(describing the “balkanization of federal civil procedure” as resulting in a “stunning array of local 
measures” that are “duplicative” and “difficult to discover, master, and satisfy,” “undermin[ing] the 
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To be sure, procedural uniformity does not necessarily depend on the 
existence of an FRCP. A Supreme Court–articulated standard might well 
have universal application; the standard set forth by the famous Erie decision 
is perhaps the best known example in procedure. But especially when it comes 
to pretrial procedure, precedential and uniformly applicable judge-made rules 
are rare, because such rulings are not often subject to appellate review. Lower 
federal judges might strive for uniformity which comes out imperfectly, or 
they might not strive for uniformity at all, instead deciding that different 
kinds of cases merit different kinds of procedural rules. 
This brings us to the third issue, the “transsubstantivity” question: 
should the same procedure rules apply to all cases? We might have a different 
rule, for example, for antitrust cases as opposed to discrimination cases, or 
for pro se cases as opposed to lawyered cases, and so on. This debate, too, 
was implicated by Twombly’s raised pleading bar—that opinion was initially 
read as possibly intended only for the antitrust context.82 The FRCP itself 
explicitly engages this tension. A few FRCP are not transsubstantive: for 
instance, Rule 9 requires specialized pleading in fraud cases.83 
Now, let us bring the MDL into this debate. There is no FRCP specific 
to the MDL—that is part of what makes the MDL unorthodox. The MDL 
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1407, concerns when MDLs are authorized, but does not 
mention the procedures that they should deploy for case management and 
resolution. FRCP 16’s case management framework may be said to loosely 
bind, or at least inspire, the MDL process.84 But virtually all of the judges 
interviewed reported that typical MDL management goes far beyond the 
confines of Rule 16. As one judge put it: “It’s like Rule 16 on steroids. In the 
MDL, you need to strategize more. You have to look beyond immediate 
deadlines and see how all the pieces fit together.” Several judges remarked that, 
if we were to characterize the creative case management that typifies the MDL 
as simply normal work occurring under Rule 16, the result would be that Rule 
16 “means nothing,” because it could accommodate virtually anything. 
 
federal rules’ core precepts”). This proliferation of local variation can be seen by consulting the 
websites of each federal district, which contain local rules and even individual rules for each judge. 
See, e.g., Recently Amended Practices, U.S. DISTRICT CT. SOUTHERN DISTRICT N.Y., 
http://www.nysd.uscourts.gov/amended_practices.php [https://perma.cc/8UM8-MLJ3]. 
82 See, e.g., Weisbarth v. Geauga Park Dist., 499 F.3d 538, 541 (6th Cir. 2007) (“Significant ‘uncertainty 
as to the intended scope of the Court’s decision [in Twombly]’ persists . . . particularly regarding its reach 
beyond the antitrust context.” (alteration in original) (quoting Iqbal v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506 (2002))). 
83 See FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
84 See FED. R. CIV. P. 16 (articulating standards for scheduling and management of 
pretrial conferences). 
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A. MDL Exceptionalism When It Comes to the Rules 
The singular theme that emerged from the interviews is what might be called 
MDL exceptionalism. All of the judges respected the FRCP, but every judge 
opposed the idea of a new FRCP for MDLs or even a uniform common law 
approach. The recurring comment was that “every MDL is different,” and that 
the very hallmark of the MDL is the ability to deviate from traditional 
procedures—i.e., for the judge to remain flexible and creative in every case. As 
in the case of the comments regarding Rule 16, several judges emphasized that 
any rule that allowed judges the required degree of flexibility would add nothing. 
Another reason that the judges resisted any kind of uniform procedure 
is their consensus view that MDL procedure is still a work in progress, but 
one that may never be complete. “MDLs are still evolving,” one judge 
reported. As an example, he pointed out that “bellwether[ trials] weren’t 
being done ten years ago and now are prevalent.” He continued: “Practices 
are always evolving. Fact sheets are a great example. It’s a big innovation, 
everyone now uses them . . . . Necessity is the reason for innovation.”85 
These comments were echoed by many judges. For example, another 
judge noted: “I see ways to change course each time, new ways to tweak it. 
At what point can we have enough experience with this type of litigation to 
formulate it into rules? If we did it too early people would just go around 
them . . . . Every case is different.” The only change suggested by a few judges 
was that a rule on MDL attorneys’ fees (and only that rule) would be helpful. 
B. Transparency 
Some academics look at the MDL landscape and worry about accessibility, 
transparency, and uniformity. If MDLs are managerial judging writ large, then 
they may implicate all of Judith Resnik’s concerns that managerial judging erodes 
traditional due process protections, eschews appellate review, threatens 
impartiality, and undermines public trials.86 However, most of the judges 
interviewed put their MDL procedures on the record, create case websites, 
transcribe all proceedings, and create phone connections to allow lawyers, litigants, 
and even state court judges to listen to all proceedings. Several judges stated that 
their attentiveness to devising and publishing these special rules for each MDL 
has made MDLs more visible to the stakeholders in any particular MDL than in 
non-MDL proceedings. Typical of the comments was: “Plaintiffs often can follow 
 
85 Fact sheets are “questionnaires eliciting a wide range of information, such as the 
circumstances of their exposures and the severity of their injuries, to facilitate settlement 
negotiations or improve claim administration following settlement.” MANUAL FOR COMPLEX 
LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 22.91 (2004) (noting the recent use of fact sheets in MDLs). 
86 See Judith Resnik, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REV. 374, 424-31 (1982). 
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an MDL better because of the website, transcript, all options and orders. Plaintiffs 
have said they get more access [to information] than in regular cases.” 
A survey of the websites of all pending MDLs on the JPML list revealed 
that only thirty-three percent of cases made procedural orders publicly 
available. Specifically, of the 245 pending MDL cases in December 2016, 111 
had websites specific to their MDL, with 80 of those websites posting 
procedural rules publicly.87 Parties may still have access to procedural orders 
through protected website access, but to the extent that a value of procedural 
transparency is that it informs the public outside of a case, and may also 
inform parties and judges for future cases, it is not clear whether the way in 
which the MDL judges make their proceedings available is accomplishing 
that goal. Of interest, however, and consistent with the judges’ reports that 
large-scale MDLs benefit from more special procedures, large MDLs are 
significantly more likely to have public websites than small ones.88 
*       *       * 
The obvious question is whether MDLs are actually so different from other 
cases. Why is every MDL unique, but not every class action? Perhaps the sheer 
numbers involved demand flexibility and make the management challenges 
different in each case. Still, one wonders why certain common MDL practices, 
such as transparency of orders, the ways in which counsel are selected, settlement 
safeguards, and attorneys’ fees issues, could not actually be standardized. 
What may be more unique is the claim-narrowing and information-gathering 
process required in each case to sufficiently educate each side before settlement 
can occur. Many of the judges interviewed emphasized that the biggest 
challenges in MDLs are often getting a handle on all the plaintiffs in the 
case, on the strengths and weakness of the various cases, and winnowing 
claims. Indeed, the very feature that makes many MDLs unamenable to class 
action—the need for individualized assessment of causation and damages—may 
be precisely what necessitates unique factfinding and discovery in each case. 
In other words, perhaps there are MDL procedures and MDL procedures. 
The discovery/claim narrowing process, although technically “procedure”, is 
 
87 This data is taken from the December 2016 update to JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT 
LITIG., MDL STATISTICS REPORT—DISTRIBUTION OF PENDING MDL DOCKETS BY ACTIONS 
PENDING (2016), http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/Pending_MDL_Dockets_By_
Actions_Pending-April-17-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/GM7N-HLXF]. 
88 Using a t-test (assuming unequal variances), the data demonstrated that larger 
MDLs were statistically significantly more likely to have a website than smaller MDLs 
(both for the historical number of actions, as well as for the number currently pending). 
Similarly, the data showed that among MDLs with websites, larger MDLs were significantly 
more likely to post procedural rules publicly than were smaller MDLs (both for the 
historical number of actions, as well as for the number currently pending). 
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essentially the very substance of the MDL. That might be where judges need 
some flexibility and the ability to innovate from case to case. That is where 
judges report creative procedure-making, such as the use of bellwethers—which 
are now used in MDLs not to manage to trial but to educate the parties 
about the kind of claims in the case89—and fact sheets, which are essentially 
plaintiffs’ questionnaires that allow for claim narrowing and education of the 
defendant about the plaintiff group.90 One judge reported that the most 
important aspect of the annual conference of MDL judges is the sharing of 
new management practices and tools for large-scale MDLs, such as 
computer programs that help to collect and categorize claims. 
But might there be less “substantive” procedures in the MDL which are more 
“procedural” in the traditional sense? Questions of communication to and among 
the parties, transparency of orders, and settlement review could be standardized 
to some benefit. Even innovative procedures could be standardized if judges were 
able to select from a menu of such procedures and add new ones to the list. 
C. The Creation of MDL Common Law 
The common law of MDL procedure has developed both individually 
and collaboratively. Judges innovate case by case, but there is a great deal 
of horizontal information sharing. All of the judges interviewed 
emphasized the importance of the annual conference of MDL judges as 
a key place for shared learning and dissemination of best practices. 
Surprisingly, many also emphasized the importance of the lawyers 
themselves in developing MDL procedures. MDL judges typically select lead 
counsel with experience in the particular kind of MDL at issue and then turn 
to those same counsel for case-management schemes from previous litigations 
and advice on the procedures to be developed to manage the current one. “It’s 
less judges making up procedures than good lawyers making them up and 
bringing them to judges,” explained one judge. “But the lawyers aren’t 
disinterested actors. Their interests aren’t my interests, but in terms of moving 
things along, getting stuff done quickly, it’s a collaboration between lawyers 
and judges. The relationship is a really different animal here.” Elizabeth Burch 
and Margaret Williams have suggested that lawyers may take advantage of 
these opportunities to create procedures in their favor.91 As further detailed in 
Part V, this procedure law–collaboration process between judge and lawyer is 
another way that the MDL creates unorthodox institutional relationships. 
 
89 See Fallon et al., supra note 63, at 2332; see also supra text accompanying note 85. 
90 See also supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
91 See Burch & Williams, supra note 5 (noting that MDLs are ripe “for repeat players 
to influence, create, and change the standard practice”). 
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Further, true to this “common law method” (a phrase actually used by one 
judge), MDL judges look at both MDL and non-MDL analogous cases for 
examples of good procedure. One example already given—the use of bellwether 
trials from the class action context for the different purpose of educating parties 
about claims in the MDL—is illustrative. One judge also pointed out that the 
concept of the common benefit fund (CBF) to compensate MDL attorneys 
comes from analogizing to the class action context.92 As another example, Judge 
Jack Weinstein, while presiding over the Zyprexa MDL proceeding, 
characterized the MDL as a “quasi–class action” in order to exert control over 
privately negotiated fee arrangements that would have been under his control 
were the case brought as a class action.93 Judge Fallon also employed the trope 
of the quasi-class in the Vioxx MDL to “giv[e] the Court equitable authority to 
review contingent fee contracts[.]”94 Some academics have been critical of these 
borrowed tools, especially where judges pick and choose among safeguards 
without including the full protections of the class action or other procedure.95 
It is also worth noting that even the MDL guidance documents that do 
exist encourage this kind of nonbinding procedural innovation. The Manual 
for Complex Litigation explicitly states that it “should not be cited as[] 
authoritative legal or administrative policy.”96 It goes further, stating: “[t]he 
absence of precedent or of legislative or rule-making solutions should not 
foreclose innovation and creativity.”97 (A few judges did say they look to the 
Manual, but all emphasized taking more cues from one another and lawyers.)98 
A major drawback of this form of procedural lawmaking, particularly as 
distinguished from the FRCP process, is that even the final results can be opaque 
 
92 Common benefit funds compensate the attorneys who work to benefit all plaintiffs even 
if they are not representing all plaintiffs. The attorneys representing individual plaintiffs, but 
not working for all plaintiffs, must contribute a portion of their fees toward the common benefit 
fund. See generally Silver & Miller, supra note 27, at 120-43. The concept of a common benefit 
fund dates back to a nineteenth-century equitable doctrine. See Judith Resnik et al., Individuals 
Within the Aggregate: Relationships, Representation, and Fees, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 296, 337 (1995). 
93 See In re Zyprexa Prods. Liab. Litig., 233 F.R.D. 122, 122 (E.D.N.Y. 2006). Although 
Judge Weinstein is credited with coining the “quasi–class action” term, its roots “extend back 
to In re Air Crash Disaster at Florida Everglades.” Silver & Miller, supra note 27, at 110 n.7 
(citing 549 F.2d 1006 (5th Cir. 1977)). Weinstein, in the earlier Agent Orange litigation, also 
asserted—over the Second Circuit’s objection—the application of “federal common law.” See 
In re Agent Orange Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740, 845–47 (E.D.N.Y. 1984). 
94 In re Vioxx Prods. Liab. Litig., 650 F. Supp. 2d 549, 554 (E.D. La. 2009). 
95 See Mullenix, supra note 26, at 391 (“MDL judges, in turn, by endorsing the concept 
of the quasi–class action . . . have become complicit in allowing private parties to accomplish 
. . . backdoor settlements . . . .”). 
96 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH), supra note 85, at Introduction. 
97 Id. at § 22.1. 
98 Similarly, the various academic conferences on MDL—like those held at Duke Law School, see 
supra note 5—were not mentioned by the interviewed judges. The major interest seems to be in the kind of 
practical information sharing about case management tools that occurs at the judges’ own MDL conference. 
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to outsiders. As one judge noted: “You are not going to see this stuff on Westlaw. 
You don’t get published opinions, you just get procedural orders.” MDL 
procedures that are published on judicial websites do not have precedential value. 
D. MDL as Delegation 
One surprising theme that emerged from the interview questions about 
MDL procedure was the concept of delegation. There is a very strong view 
(from the admittedly biased sample group of MDL judges themselves) that 
MDL judges not only need discretion but are particularly worthy of the 
discretion that they have been given. Virtually every judge reported that only 
the “best” and “most experienced” judges are assigned MDLs in the first place. 
The JPML is the panel of judges that decides whether to consolidate cases 
into MDLs, where the consolidated cases will be heard (i.e., which district), 
and which judges shall preside. This opportunity to hand-pick the judge for 
each case is not fully replicated in any other aspect of civil procedure.99 And it 
results in, or at least seems to imply to the judges themselves, special confidence 
in the judgment of those selected to innovate and manage procedurally. 
When asked about how the JPML selects judges, many respondents 
said that newer MDL judges are given “easy cases, as they build expertise.” 
One judge with experience on the JPML said: 
When we grant an MDL, we look to whether a judge has particular 
experience; we are telling the judge this is a different kind of case because we 
are giving it to you. We are asking them to bring their experience to bear and 
figure out what remedy and procedure to use. 
This feeling of special delegation may continue even on appeal. As the 
Third Circuit recently noted—quoting the D.C. Circuit—appellate courts 
review orders “with deference, particularly in the MDL context. . . .[d]istrict 
judges must have authority to manage their dockets, especially during a 
massive litigation such as this, and we owe deference to their decisions 
on whether and how to enforce the deadlines they impose[.]”100 
Outside the MDL context, the modern innovation most linked to the 
concept of delegation in civil procedure has been the use of magistrate judges. 
But this is decidedly not the kind of delegation that most of the MDL judges 
interviewed have in mind. In fact, many judges volunteered—without being 
 
99 One judge pointed out that similar discretion exists, in at least some circuits, for which 
district court judges are invited to sit on appellate panels and for the use of magistrates. For more 
on the latter in the MDL context, see infra note 101 and accompanying text. 
100 In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 718 F.3d 236, 243 (3d Cir. 2013) (first 
alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Fannie Mae Sec. 
Litig., 552 F.3d 814, 822–23 (D.C. Cir. 2009)). 
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questioned on this topic—that, unlike in most other cases, they generally do 
not give work to magistrates in MDL cases.101 (Many do use special masters 
instead, another unorthodoxy.) One reason is that any appeal from a 
magistrate decision requires a written opinion from the federal judge, and 
MDL judges are particularly focused on efficiency, so introducing the 
magistrate judge undermines that goal. The primary reason, though, was 
clearly attitudinal. Quite simply, the MDL judges interviewed like to be 
intimately involved in this work, and even more importantly, see themselves 
as essential players in it. The pleasure of feeling important appears in play. 
E. Unorthodox Lawmaking, Redux 
I return to the concept of unorthodox lawmaking here because, in other 
lawmaking contexts, similar innovations in delegation, rulemaking, and 
deviations from uniformity are characteristic of how legal systems have 
responded to modern challenges when they are reluctant to change the 
textbook model itself. Congress and the executive branch delegate to states, 
experts, private entities, and decision-making commissions to make difficult 
or especially challenging decisions.102 They deviate from longstanding and 
uniform rules—such as notice-and-comment rulemaking or rules about 
committee hearings, the filibuster, or conference committees—to create 
workarounds that help make and implement modern law. These workarounds 
include, for instance, bulletins and guidance issued without notice-and-comment 
to sidestep the APA103 and fast-track legislative processes to bypass the filibuster 
and conference committees.104 Party leaders, like MDL judges, are less 
substantive experts than practical problem solvers, and their use of unorthodox 
procedures increases their power at the expense of the more traditional, and 
flatter, organization of lawmaking led by congressional committees. 
The MDL analogously has created a judicial elite among district court 
judges and transformed the role of the judge for this class of cases. Across all of 
these examples, and certainly internal to procedure itself, the question is 
whether the overcoming of obstacles by the unorthodox process—in the case of 
the MDL, the centralizing of national cases into federal court at a scale 
otherwise extremely difficult, if not impossible, to resolve—has more value than 
 
101 Obviously, there are exceptions. See, e.g., Pretrial Order #1 at 7, In re Am. Med. Sys., Inc. Pelvic 
Repair Sys. Prods. Liab. Litig., No. 2325 (S.D. W. Va. Feb. 29, 2012), http://www.wvsd.uscourts.gov/
MDL/amsinc/pdfs/PTO_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/T2K2-CMM2] (referring all discovery disputes to a 
magistrate judge); see also Eduardo C. Robreno, The Federal Asbestos Product Liability Multidistrict 
Litigation (MDL-875): Black Hole or New Paradigm?, 23 WIDENER L. J. 97, 187-88 (2013) (“The duties 
and burden of administering a large MDL must be shared with . . . . magistrate judges . . . .”). 
102 See Gluck et al., supra note 28, at 1812. 
103 Id. at 1810-11. 
104 Id. at 1813-14. 
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the procedures circumvented by the untraditional process. Another question is 
whether there might be an alternative form more in sync with traditional norms. 
 
IV. MDL, ACCESS TO COURT, AND THE CLASS ACTION COMPARISON 
What are we comparing MDLs to? Academics worry that MDLs will 
exacerbate the broader trend toward “closing the courthouse doors.”105 
The class action tends to be held out in such scholarship as the ideal when 
it comes to aggregation,106 and is the form of aggregation with which the 
nonexpert public is most familiar. Alternative forms of dispute 
resolution, including MDLs and arbitration, are sometimes charged with 
undermining the class action in ways that harm litigants.107 
This criticism did not resonate with the judges interviewed for this 
project. As a doctrinal matter, most judges felt MDLs and class actions are 
apples and oranges because, as many judges said, “most MDLs could never 
be certified.” They emphasized that MDLs, especially those grounded in 
tort, have too many individual elements to satisfy Rule 23. They also 
differentiated between the two types of actions because Rule 23 “manages to 
trial,” whereas MDLs are “a totally different animal.” As one judge put it: 
The biggest difference between the class action and the MDL is that you can’t 
really try the MDL so I am, at a very early stage, trying to group it . . . into 
4-5 groups and I ask the lawyers to select 40 cases or so that represent the 
groups, and then I tell the parties just discover those. We do a limited 
discovery pool. Then we do bellwether cases . . . . We don’t do this in a class 
action at all. 
More than seventy-five percent of MDLs involve class actions.108 
Often there are multiple class actions within a single MDL, typically 
with individual claims also consolidated in the same MDL as well.109 
Combining multiple class actions into one larger class action instead of 
an MDL is generally not possible because of issues that divide them, 
 
105 See, e.g., Redish & Karaba, supra note 14, at 154 (presenting a “frontal assault on the 
constitutionality of the MDL”). 
106 See Mullenix, supra note 26, at 390; see also Silver & Miller, supra note 27, at 113 
(noting differences between MDLs and class actions). 
107 See Mullenix, supra note 26, at 390. 
108 See U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG., STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF 
MULTIDISTRICT LITIGATION, http://www.jpml.uscourts.gov/sites/jpml/files/JPML_
Statistical_Analysis_of_Multidistrict_Litigation-FY-2016_1.pdf [https://perma.cc/C6KQ-
AK6Y]. 
109 Id. 
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such as differences across state law.110 Indeed, most judges interviewed 
expressed outright confusion when asked whether it would be salutary to 
loosen the Rule 23 requirements to allow more MDLs, or all MDLs, to 
be treated like class actions. One judge put it this way: “What would 
granting a class action do? It wouldn’t make a difference. You can’t have 
a class action with 900,000 people injured. Call it what you want, call it 
an elephant, you still need to individually prove everything, you have 
individual damages. This is the nature of modern litigation.” 
Of course, the judges interviewed are unlikely to report that their 
procedures limit access to court. But academics who complain that MDLs 
diminish access to court should confront the argument that, without MDLs, 
there might be substantially less access. By way of comparison, and returning 
to the title of this Article, Barbara Sinclair, the political scientist who 
pioneered the idea of “unorthodox lawmaking,” began her work two decades 
ago as deeply critical of how modern legislative process–workarounds 
undermine the orthodoxies of the traditional lawmaking process. By the 
fourth edition of her book, however, published just five years ago, Sinclair 
had become a convert. Why? She came to the conclusion that, in the current 
environment of partisan gridlock and legislative complexity, legislation 
simply would not get made without unorthodox procedures.111 For Sinclair, 
the laws themselves were a more important public good than the traditional 
procedures that historically framed the legislative process. 
There is an analogous set of considerations in civil procedure. And they 
implicate an analogous tradeoff. Is access to court the ultimate good (akin to 
Sinclair’s production of legislation itself); or is procedure for procedure’s 
sake—the preservation of a uniform, transsubstantive, FRCP-minted 
procedure—a more important long-term system value? Critics of the MDL 
tend not to pose their objections in terms of this tradeoff, but these critics have yet 
to suggest how to harmonize the dueling considerations. During the interviews, 
many judges argued that it would be simply too expensive for individuals to mount 
such cases alone or to find representation, even for a handful of cases. In this regard, 
it is striking to see, in this volume, even Judith Resnik, one of the foremost critics 
of nontraditional case management, mirroring Sinclair’s evolution in the legislative 
context and recognizing the access-to-court benefits of the MDL.112 
One judge said: “the only way we can ensure people can get lawyers is to 
most efficiently manage the cases. When I look at the MDL, I see more 
 
110 See Andrew D. Bradt, The Shortest Distance: Direct Filing and Choice of Law in 
Multidistrict Litigation, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 759, 761 (2012). 
111 See BARBARA SINCLAIR, UNORTHODOX LAWMAKING: NEW LEGISLATIVE 
PROCESSES IN THE U.S. CONGRESS 273-76 (4th ed. 2012). 
112 See generally Judith Resnik, “Vital” State Interests: From Representative Actions for Fair Labor 
Standards to Pooled Trusts, Class Actions, and MDLs in the Federal Courts, 165 U. PA. L. REV. 1765 (2017). 
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people getting some redress than it would be if it had to be litigated fully.” 
Another focused on the national and modern aspects: “It’s not about closing 
the courthouse doors at all . . . . They never would have been able to be 
litigated on their own, especially for mass torts . . . . [W]hen you have mass 
litigation, the notion of the individual plaintiff is totally anachronistic.” 
The judges were not painting rainbows. They recognized that plaintiffs 
lose control of their cases through consolidation. They also acknowledged 
that the issue for plaintiffs of being represented by lawyers who the 
plaintiffs have not themselves selected, often in jurisdictions far away, is no 
small concern. As Martin Redish and Julie Karaba point out, when most of 
these plaintiffs file a lawsuit, they have no idea that the local attorney they 
choose is not likely to be the attorney directing their case, “because unless 
they are tag-along plaintiffs, they are unaware that they will eventually be 
transferred into an MDL.”113 One judge surmised there might even be 
constitutional problems when a plaintiff “has to watch helplessly as the case 
is sent to, say, New York and lead counsel is appointed who is totally 
unknown to the plaintiff.”114 
Resnik, Dennis Curtis, and Deborah Hensler have shown how the 
absence of individual attention in a litigation can undermine plaintiffs’ 
perception of the legitimacy of a legal proceeding, regardless of outcome.115 
To these concerns, the judges interviewed generally replied as did this one: 
“The question is whether a case goes forward at all. Is the choice essentially 
an MDL consolidation as opposed to not being able to litigate at all?” 
Another said: 
Access is all well and good but for these cases it is pie in the sky. There are 
thousands of cases, enormous overlap. Would it be preferable to have those 
cases litigated in different courts in the country with different answers, 
different discovery? For a defendant to spend money on duplicative efforts 
instead of making the plaintiffs whole? How could you even function that 
way in cases like [ongoing MDLs involving] GM, the BP spill, pharma, or 
pelvic mesh? 
One challenge for academics who disagree that the MDL is the answer to the 
access-to-court problem, then, is to identify what better alternatives might exist. 
But it is not all about the plaintiffs, either. The judges’ positive 
impressions of the MDL seem motivated at least in part by what MDLs 
make feasible for judges and defendants, neither of which have limitless 
 
113 Redish & Karaba, supra note 14, at 125. 
114 Redish and Karaba have similarly argued the appointment system is an unconstitutional 
violation of due process. Id. at 133. 
115 Resnik et al., supra 92, at 371-72. 
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capacity. For example, an individual litigant harmed by GM could “function” 
in an individual case, and it might well be worth it to her economically to 
bring the case if the value to her is sufficient. But how judges and defendants 
could handle these cases in nonaggregated form is a different question. For 
defendants, MDLs offer many obvious advantages, not least of which is 
being relieved of the burden of litigating simultaneously in multiple fora 
that may have conflicting rulings and being able to expose their key witnesses 
and discovery in general to only one round of coordinated scrutiny. 
V. MDLS AND THE TRADITIONAL INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS 
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
The final lens through which we might examine the MDL is the institutional 
arrangements that structure American civil procedure. As noted at the outset, 
this Article puts to the side the most central relationship of all, that between the 
lawyer and her client. The MDL’s impact on that relationship, as well as the role 
of MDL lead counsel in general, has been well analyzed in the academic 
literature.116 Instead, this final part focuses on other ways in which the MDL 
reconfigures traditional relationships among lawyers and judges in the system. 
A. Horizontal Federal Judicial Relationships and the New Judicial Elite 
The MDL implicates two different types of horizontal relationships among 
federal district judges. The first, as alluded to in Part II, is what might be called the 
horizontal legitimacy of the federal district courts. One overarching motivation for 
the MDL, at least as the judges interviewed see it, is “to avoid whipsawing litigants 
and undermining judges” and to prevent a “race to judgment.” The MDL, 
conceived this way, protects the flat horizontal organization of the federal district 
courts, ensuring that no district is perceived as superior to another. 
On the other hand, and in almost direct contrast, the MDL has arguably helped 
to create a judicial elite among federal district judges. Being selected by the JPML 
for case assignment, as others have observed and as all of the interviewed judges 
agree, is a mark of prestige.117 It is a way, like assignments to high profile judicial 
and rulemaking committees, for life-tenured federal judges (most of whom do not 
expect any further job promotion) effectively to rise in their own ranks.118 
The judges who are selected as MDL judges view themselves as more qualified 
than other judges. The judges left out complain of unfairness and even 
 
116 See, e.g., Charles Silver, The Responsibilities of Lead Lawyers and Judges in Multidistrict 
Litigations, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1985 (2011). 
117 See Burch, Remanding Multidistrict Litigation, supra note 5, at 417 (noting federal 
judges often “campaign” for MDL assignments). 
118 See also supra note 12 and accompanying text. 
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discrimination. MDL judges are predominantly white and male, a trend former 
JPML Chair Judge John Heyburn is widely credited with starting to reverse.119 In 
2010 only 17% of MDL judges were judges assigned their first ever MDL; by 2015 
that number was 61%, with almost 200 judges having at least one MDL.120 The 
current JPML Chair, Judge Sarah Vance, is the first woman to hold that position.121 
The judges interviewed were blunt: “Judges aren’t created equal. I am doing 
a good job in my MDL so people will come back to me. Some judges are 
notoriously slow. This leads to repeat players. You need to assign cases to judges 
who understand how to move this along.” (We can see here, too, the high 
premium put on speed as marker of success in MDLs—a norm that pervades 
other aspects of civil litigation as well, and deserves its own separate treatment.) 
The judges who are assigned MDLs universally report that they enjoy 
them because they are the “most challenging and best litigated cases,” and 
almost universally describe them as “the best cases, with the best lawyers. 
They are well financed and so the cases are presented in the most 
sophisticated way.” The feeling that these are the plum cases likely 
deepens the resentment of those judges who are not chosen to participate. 
But to those who are chosen, an MDL assignment is perceived—at least 
by the judges interviewed—as a reward. As one judge put it: “This is our 
dessert. This is why we eat our diet. This is our reward for the prisoner cases. 
Academics are wrong to think we just want to settle and get rid of these cases.” 
B. Relationships With and Among Counsel: The Dominance of Consent 
MDLs operate by consent in almost every respect. This is a key element of 
their unorthodoxy. The procedures for each MDL are developed by consent. 
Litigants must waive their right to remand for the MDL judge to be able to 
dispose of their cases.122 Some jurisdictions now even allow litigants, by consent, 
to file cases directly in the MDL court (the so-called “direct file order”), without 
having to first file in their home jurisdiction and then have the JPML transfer 
 
119 See John G. Heyburn II & Francis E. McGovern, Evaluating and Improving the MDL 
Process, LITIGATION, Summer/Fall 2012, at 26, 30 (“The federal judiciary contains a deep 
bench of amazing talent, and we are taking advantage of it.”). 
120 At the request of the author, JPML Chair Sarah S. Vance asked the Panel staff to identify the 
transferee judges assigned to MDLs during the designated time periods and compare them to Panel records 
to determine which judges were receiving their first MDL assignment. Judge Vance also provided the author 
information regarding the results of its internal surveys of MDL interest among federal district judges. 
121 See Vance First Woman to Chair Major-Litigation Panel, TUL. U. L. SCH. (Nov. 5, 2014), 
http://www.law.tulane.edu/tlsNews/newsItem.aspx?id=19074 [https://perma.cc/JYC5-VUJF]. 
122 Cf. Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 41-43 (1998) 
(emphasizing the “plaintiff ’s right to a remand once the pretrial stage has been completed”). 
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them.123 After consolidation is ordered, new plaintiffs also often file “tag-along” 
actions, which request permission from the JPML to join the MDL. Ironically, 
the one aspect of MDLs from which consent is absent is in the creation of the 
MDL itself. Section 1407’s transfer power is unilateral; plaintiffs are not allowed 
to opt out of MDL centralization, as that would defeat a core purpose of the 
MDL statute in the first place.124 This is a major difference also from the 
23(b)(3) class action, which does permit opt-outs (although MDL plaintiffs can 
still choose in the end not to settle and demand remand to the home district). 
All of the judges described their own relationships with counsel as 
unusually collaborative. They also described the lead counsels’ relationships 
with one another in the same way. All interviewed said that class actions did 
not foster these same kinds of relationships. One distinguishing feature in 
this regard—another unorthodox deviation from the typical litigation—is 
that the MDL judge gets to select the case’s lead counsels (not just the lead 
plaintiffs, or the lead firm, as judges do in some class actions). The Manual 
for Complex Litigation advises judges to “take an active part in the decision 
on the appointment of counsel”;125 a pamphlet published by the Federal 
Judicial Center suggests that transferee judges contact other judges to gain 
further information about the lawyers they may want to select as counsel.126 
Judges may also name committees of counsel, typically referred to as steering 
committees, to help resolve differences among counsel. Lead attorneys and 
their steering committees are accorded prestige, higher compensation, and 
the chance to gain or sharpen MDL expertise, while the remaining attorneys 
become dependent on this small group to represent their clients.127 
Selection of counsel is just the beginning of unorthodoxies in the MDL 
judge–counsel relationship. The judges interviewed take clear pleasure in 
directly engaging with the lawyers in these cases. As previously noted, they 
look to the lawyers to help them devise procedures. One judge observed: 
Most MDL judges are involved more personally in these cases than other cases. 
For example in a recent case I told the lawyers we are wrapping up these cases 
and remanding everything in twelve months. I had a conference in person, it 
 
123 See Bradt, supra note 110, at 794 (“Direct filing allows the parties to bypass the 
administratively burdensome transfer process, and the court, in many cases, is allowed to 
retain complete jurisdiction over the cases to better facilitate a bellwether trial plan.”). 
124 See Silver & Miller, supra note 27, at 124. 
125 MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH), supra note 85, at § 10.224. 
126 U.S. JUDICIAL PANEL ON MULTIDISTRICT LITIG. & FED. JUDICIAL CTR., TEN 
STEPS TO BETTER CASE MANAGEMENT 2 (2d ed. 2014), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/
default/files/2014/Ten-Steps-MDL-Clerks-2D.pdf [https://perma.cc/RVN2-58JC] (“Your 
judicial colleagues are a valuable source of information [when selecting lawyers to appoint as 
counsel]. Feel free to contact other MDL judges for evaluations of particular lawyers.”). 
127 See Silver & Miller, supra note 27, at 118-19. 
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was off the record, roll-up-sleeves work. I don’t usually do this at all in civil 
cases, usually the [magistrate judges] do the pretrial management. This creates 
wonderful relationships and is very satisfying. It’s problem solving together. 
It is not just that the procedures and relationships are unorthodox. The 
work of the MDL itself, at least in the judges’ perspectives, seems different 
from ordinary litigation. A separate question is why litigants in non-MDL 
cases should not benefit from the same kind of judicial attention. 
A system premised on consent also raises concerns about adequacy and 
vigorousness of representation. Much has been written on consent in the 
class action context,128 and more recently in the context of what consent 
means in an era of mandatory arbitration clauses.129 Less attention has been 
paid to the critical role that consent plays throughout MDL system, and 
not just in the settlement context, where most of the attention has been 
trained. The attenuated relationship between plaintiff and counsel (who is 
almost surely not the counsel that plaintiff chose) combined with the close 
relationships among adverse lead counsels and the judge herself surely 
challenges traditional notions of how to evaluate consent. 
But when pressed on whether MDL counsel disserve their clients by 
emphasizing cooperation and being less adversarial, the judges 
emphatically resisted. All emphasized the outstanding quality of MDL 
lawyering, indeed mentioning it time and again as the main reason judges 
want these cases. Many analogized MDL attorneys to a “specialized bar,” 
like the small criminal and patent bars with repeat-player attorneys who 
have developed collegial ways of interacting. “It’s very different in MDL 
than in class action,” one judge said, “You have to work as a team, it’s less 
adversarial. You need to discuss it and . . . to get along. When I form a 
[plaintiff steering committee] I try to create a virtual law firm: good trial 
lawyers, good organizers, people who work well together. It’s a very 
different dynamic.” Another explained that MDL lawyers 
are not less adversarial. They are just better lawyers. They pick battles wisely 
and agree on many things, and focus on battles on things that really matter. 
They are still being zealous advocates, absolutely. At the end of the day, this 
isn’t to say there aren’t common interests. Most lawyers recognize at the end 
 
128 See, e.g., Fiss, supra note 20, at 1078 (describing settlement incentives that 
disincentivize adversarial conduct); see also Henry Paul Monaghan, Antisuit Injunctions and 
Preclusion Against Absent Nonresident Class Members, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1148, 1185-87 (1998). 
129 See, e.g., Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate Through 
Predispute Arbitration Clauses: The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 
55, 73-74 (2004); Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of Arbitration, the 
Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2840 (2015); Jean R. 
Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1635-36 (2005). 
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of the day they will settle, and both are just trying to cross that line and get 
leverage. But getting there still involves aggressive motion practice. There is 
no collusion. It’s like the criminal bar. A smaller community, repeat players. 
Lawyers are more likely to encounter each other again and again, so there is 
an incentive for folks to play nicely in the sandbox. 
It goes without saying that being named lead MDL counsel also has its 
marker of prestige, as selection does for the judges.130 Several of the judges 
interviewed described similar tensions as those in the judicial selection 
context between the desire to democratize lead counsel appointments and the 
necessity of ensuring that experts are in the driver’s seat. As one noted, “I 
have heard the concerns about the elite group of lawyers but every judge 
wants to have someone with expertise.” Another said: “If you are going to do 
brain surgery you aren’t going to do it with someone who has never done it 
before. People know the lawyers. They respect and trust them. They get 
resume value by being on the committee.” 
The repeat-player nature of appointed MDL counsel has raised concern 
among some academics. Burch has pointed out, in regard to the Vioxx 
litigation, “[t]hree of the four lead lawyers in Guidant were also appointed to 
leadership positions in Vioxx, and one lead attorney in both of those litigations 
was also a lead lawyer in the Genetically Modified Rice Litigation.”131 She and 
Williams have argued that MDL settlements benefit repeat-player attorneys 
more than one-shot clients.132 
Consent obviously also plays a large role in settlement, and several judges 
raised “serious due process concerns when cases are settled by inventory when 
there isn’t a class.” “Voluntary” agreement to the terms of a settlement can feel 
mandatory for plaintiffs. In the Vioxx case, for instance, “if any clients decided 
not to participate in the settlement, the lawyer was required to withdraw from 
representing the nonsettling clients.”133 Robert Bone and Burch would both 
pierce the veil of this formal consent, again because of the closeness of the 
 
130 Redish & Karaba, supra note 14, at 124-25; Silver & Miller, supra note 27, at 171. 
131 Burch, Judging Multidistrict Litigation, supra note 5, at 82 (alteration in original) 
(footnote omitted). See generally Burch & Williams, supra note 5 (empirically assessing the 
rise and implications of repeat players in multidistrict litigation). 
132 Burch & Williams, supra note 5, at 4; cf. Richard A. Nagareda, Embedded Aggregation in Civil 
Litigation, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1105, 1171 (2010) (arguing that the Vioxx settlement was a good 
example of “a response in the nature of hybridization—one that exposes hybrids of traditional litigation 
features with aggregate ones and that then seeks to regulate them as such, not to shoehorn them 
awkwardly within either the class action device or the traditional model of the one-on-one lawsuit” 
(emphasis added)). 
133 Erichson & Zipursky, supra note 14, at 266. 
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leading relationships of everyone in the MDL except the client.134 Burch 
describes the plaintiffs’ position as “a Morton’s Fork: one must either continue 
litigating in front of and incur the displeasure of a judge who has played an 
active role in encouraging settlement or accept the settlement offer.”135 
It should be noted that there are exceptions to the ubiquity of consent. 
But the exceptions raise problems of their own. A good example lies in 
the ongoing personal injury–toxic tort MDL against DuPont. DuPont 
refuses to settle and instead prefers to fight each case individually.136 But 
at the rate of four-to-six individual trials per year, plaintiffs’ attorneys 
have calculated that it would take between 583 and 875 years to try each 
of the approximately 3500 cases.137 What justice then? 
C. Horizontal Judicial Relationships Across State and Federal Systems 
Federalism questions attendant to MDLs have not received deep 
academic attention either.138 Many MDLs implicate federalism issues 
because the MDL is unable to formally consolidate all pending actions in 
one federal court, because § 1407 cannot transfer actions that remain 
pending in state courts around the country. The Class Action Fairness Act 
has complicated things further by bringing more multistate cases into 
federal court. Federalism tensions become unavoidable in these situations. 
In the interviews, the MDL judges were asked about their relationships 
with state court judges and about the risk that important differences across 
state law are being smoothed over in consolidation. It is difficult to determine 
if those concerns were validated. On the one hand, most of the judges 
emphasized their processes of coordinating with state courts with parallel 
proceedings. Some of the judges reported that they call their state counterparts 
immediately on assignment, offer to do joint status conferences, joint discovery 
rulings, even joint opinions and settlement negotiations.139 Some request the 
appointment of a special liaison from the state case to attend every meeting. 
This kind of coordination and collaboration, too, depends on consent. 
 
134 Burch, Disaggregating, supra note 5, at 682; see also Bone, supra note 14, at 335 (“Consent cannot 
validate an otherwise unjust settlement when the consent is the result of serious flaws in the procedural system 
. . . .”). 
 135 Burch, Disaggregating, supra note 5, at 682. 
136 See Plaintiffs’ Steering Comm.’s Trial Proposal for the Post-Bellwether Trials at 13, In re 
E.I. DuPont de Nemors & Co. C-8 Pers. Injury Litig., No. 2-13-MD-2433 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 18 2015). 
137 Id. Almost all of the cases originate in one state, so remanding would put far greater 
burdens on trial judges in this instance (where the alleged harm is particularly localized) 
than an instance in which a remand would send cases to many different federal districts. 
138 For an exception, see William W. Schwarzer et al., Judicial Federalism in Action: 
Coordination of Litigation in State and Federal Courts, 78 VA. L. REV. 1689, 1693-1742 (1992). 
139 See also id. at 1708-26. 
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On the other hand, most of the judges ask the parties in the state court 
proceeding to pay into the common benefit fund in the federal case—the fund 
that covers fees for counsel in the federal MDL. This is a controversial practice 
that often creates tension.140 A kind of coerced consent also figures in here. 
One state court judge called this “a huge problem. People get very upset, this 
is where we feel like we are the step-children but we don’t feel we have ways 
around it. If you don’t go into the CBF it puts the kibosh on cooperation.” 
When it comes to substantive differences across state law, some of the 
federal judges acknowledged that state law issues can get “mushed” together 
by the MDL’s tendency to group similar cases together—cases that may 
include actions from states with closely related laws. But many judges insisted 
that they make efforts to apply the different state laws. If true, a perhaps 
counterintuitive way to think of the MDL would be as pro-federalist in a modern 
sense: a national litigation regime that allows—indeed expects—internal state 
variation. In different contexts, I have made similar observations about other 
modern federal lawmaking regimes that provide national frameworks and yet 
build state law variation into them. For instance, many federal statutes 
incorporate state law, and so the meaning of federal law varies from state to 
state.141 I label these kinds of regimes (and there are many) “national 
federalism.”142 It is intriguing to consider MDLs in that category. 
That said, none of the judges interviewed mentioned such a virtue. 
Rather, a less-sunny view came from many of the judges, who reported 
“tremendous difficulties” with state law issues. Several pointed to one recent 
opinion (from the GM ignition switch MDL) by Judge Jesse Furman in the 
Southern District of New York addressing precisely this issue. Judge Furman 
rejected counsels’ attempts to lump state law claims together. He explained 
that “subtle differences in state law can dictate different results for plaintiffs 
in different jurisdictions,”143 and so “while it entail[ed] a significant amount 
of repetition” his “Opinion and Order analyze[d] each claim in conjunction 
with precedent from the relevant jurisdiction.”144 Several judges said 
Judge Furman’s opinion was exceptional, and most said that differences 
across state law claims are more typically ignored, or at least blended. 
Some circuit court judges who reviewed this Article also remarked 
on the frequency with which they have had to reverse MDL judges for 
 
140 See also FED. JUDICIAL CTR. & NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, COORDINATING 
MULTIJURISDICTION LITIGATION 7 (2013) (recognizing “the common benefit approach can 
create conflict”). 
141 See generally Abbe R. Gluck, Our [National] Federalism, 123 YALE L.J. 1996 (2013). 
142 Id. 
143 In re Gen. Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litig., No. 14-MC-2543(JMF), 2016 WL 
3920353, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. July 15, 2016). 
144 Id. at *2. 
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failing to pay attention to state law and the differences in applicable 
state law among MDL plaintiffs.145 However, this may be a problem of 
aggregation that is not unique to MDLs, since a similar criticism has 
been levied in the context of settlement class actions.146 
One judge described a different kind of state/federal law problem in a typical 
MDL: there is often confusion about which law controls—confusion that results 
from different stages of the case occurring in different circuits, each with their own 
interpretations of state and federal law. For instance, assume that an MDL judge 
in Philadelphia issues a decision on summary judgment involving state law in a case 
that includes some cases from the Sixth Circuit. When the case is later remanded 
to the district court in Ohio, the Sixth Circuit would be reviewing a Philadelphia 
court that applied Ohio state law, but used the procedural and other federal law of 
the Third Circuit, which may not be the same as the Sixth’s. Thus horizontal federal 
law, in addition to state law, may get confused or blended. 
Some of the state court judges interviewed complained that MDLs have 
become more attractive than some class actions in state court, and that plaintiffs 
are using MDLs to “jump around” the state court system. Some state judges 
also complained about classic Erie problems, such as federal judges not following 
state law requirements on matters such as pre-pleading screening rules.147 A lack 
of formal guidance about how certain cross-system issues should be handled was 
widely acknowledged, from issues relating to substantive law questions to 
questions about attorneys’ fees. One federal MDL judge complained that the 
defendant in one of his cases “repeatedly raised [the] possibility of my forcing 
state judges to do things, but I had reservations about scope of my authority,” 
and yet had no controlling authority to consult on that question. 
Both sides, unsurprisingly, want to be in the lead. One state court judge 
said: “If I get the case first I hit the ground running to get out in front of the 
MDL. We want to cooperate and coordinate but we don’t want to cooperate 
and coordinate ourselves out of the system.” Some of the federal judges 
likewise emphasized the need to issue their own joint coordination orders early 
to “be sure the MDL case gets out front . . . . This is one place the plaintiff ’s 
and defendant’s interest in the MDL are aligned, both wanted me to get state 
judges under control, and to ignore objections of state plaintiffs’ counsel.” 
 
145 For two recent examples from the Ninth Circuit, see Alexander v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 
765 F.3d 981 (9th Cir. 2014); and Slayman v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 765 F.3d 1033 (9th Cir. 2014). 
146 See, e.g., Howard M. Erichson, The Problem of Settlement Class Actions, 82 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 951, 980 (2014). 
147 Several judges mentioned additional pleading requirements common in state law 
personal injury cases. Some states, for example, require an expert report before allowing a 
medical case to go forward. This is an unresolved Erie question with purchase outside the 
MDL: does Erie require a federal court to apply pre-pleading requirements as part of the 
substantive law of the state, or does Rule 8 effectively displace those requirements? For an 
example of the first approach, see Chamberlain v. Giamppa, 210 F.3d 154, 161-62 (3d Cir. 2000). 
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In 2014, a joint state–federal MDL study group was convened to produce best 
practice guidelines for state and federal interaction in the MDL context. State 
court judges were also recently invited for the first time to the MDL judges’ 
annual conference.148 One judge reported that the state judge participation at the 
MDL conference has been very effective in driving the “message across in 
person” of the need “to always remember the parallel state court action.” 
D. The Final Vertical Relationship: Appellate Review 
Finally, as already alluded to, the MDL disrupts traditional practices of 
appellate review. This is not just because so much of MDL work is done in the 
pretrial context. Another important reason, as one judge put it, “is because we 
try to do everything by consensus. This also means there is not much to appeal. 
You are operating outside the rules so you need consensus or else you are getting 
mandamus and interlocutory appeals. Consensus works to everyone’s advantage.” 
The fact that pretrial orders are not routinely appealable under 28 U.S.C 
§ 1291 is clearly an enormous factor, with a variety of implications.149 Most 
obvious is the limitation it places on access to court—in particular, access 
to a different judge from the MDL district judge and the inability for error 
correction relating to pretrial rulings that can have enormous significance 
for many litigants. The lack of appellate review also means that little 
decisional law has developed to guide MDL judges and litigants, or to make 
MDL procedure consistent across jurisdictions. In the GM MDL described 
above, Judge Furman issued another opinion expressing surprise at the 
degree to which so much MDL procedure law remains unsettled.150 
The judges interviewed for this study discussed the desire for some 
decisional law. But most focused on attorneys’ fees and settlement, because they 
prefer more flexibility on other matters, such as structuring the MDL’s factfinding 
and claim-narrowing processes. One judge mentioned uncertainty about the 
common question of whether an MDL judge could “force lawyers not in your 
case into the common benefit fund,” and as evidence of that uncertainty pointed 
out a circuit split on whether that decision was permissible by consent.151 
*       *       * 
 
148 Academics and other speakers have also recently been invited. 
149 See Andrew S. Pollis, The Need for Non-Discretionary Interlocutory Appellate Review 
in Multidistrict Litigation, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 1643, 1647-48 (2011). 
150 In re Gen. Motors LLC Ignition Switch Litig., No. 14-MC-2543(JMF), 2016 WL 
3920353, at *7-8 (S.D.N.Y. June 10, 2015). 
151 Compare In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 764 F.3d 864, 874 (8th Cir. 2014) 
(finding party consent necessary), with In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. Litig., 582 F.3d 524, 
533-38 (3d Cir. 2009) (affirming the MDL judge’s discretion). 
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One way to address unorthodoxies in modern lawmaking is to bend 
modern legal frameworks to those new formats. The idea (maligned by the 
interviewees in this study) of a new rule of procedure for the MDL would be 
one way to do so. In the context of appellate review, and arising from the desire 
to foster development of a law of MDL procedure, a perhaps less controversial 
modification might be to alter the final order rule. Of course, such a 
modification, unless cabined to the MDL context, would have a ripple effect 
far beyond the MDL to all pretrial work and could overwhelm the appellate 
docket. It would also drag out MDLs significantly, because presumably there 
would be appeals every step of the way. Avoiding such scenarios is precisely 
one of the reasons we have the final order rule in the first place.152 
Such ripple effects often pose challenges for attempts to tailor legal 
frameworks to unorthodox lawmaking, as analogous considerations in other 
fields illustrate. The idea of special statutory interpretation rules for 
omnibus bills, for example, raises the question of why we would not also have 
special interpretation rules for especially long, even if non-omnibus, statutes, 
or for especially short ones. Yet creating special and exclusive frameworks 
for only unorthodox procedures entrenches their very exceptionalism. In 
a procedure system still largely grounded in transsubstantivity, the 
challenge is how far any proposed modification might extend. 
E. A Snapshot of MDL Appellate Review 
This is not to say there are no MDL cases in the federal courts of appeals. 
A brief review, based on cases accessible in Westlaw, reveals at least 100 MDL 
cases that reached the circuit courts on direct review over the past five years.153 
About a quarter of those cases reviewed procedural questions related to the 
MDL. Almost all of these cases made it up on appeal via § 1291, typically 
appealing a grant of dismissal, summary judgment, an order for fees, or under 
Rule 23(f) as appeals of class certification decisions. There were a handful of 
interlocutory appeals via 28 U.S.C. § 1292 and one mandamus. 
The issues at stake in these cases included matters such as the 
apportionment of attorneys’ fees, choice of law, and appellate jurisdiction. 
For example, in 2014, in the NFL concussion MDL, the Third Circuit wrote 
 
152 Cf. Mohawk Industries, Inc. v. Carpenter, 558 U.S. 100, 106 (2009) (“Permitting piecemeal, 
prejudgment appeals, we have recognized, undermines ‘efficient judicial administration’ and 
encroaches upon the prerogatives of district court judges, who play a ‘special role’ in managing 
ongoing litigation.” (quoting Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981))). 
153 These rough figures capture appeals reviewing decisions of the transferee court or the 
JPML, but not all appeals that arise post-remand or all cases about MDLs in general, as there are 
cases that relate to MDLs but do not arise directly from them. For instance, a case concerning “law 
of the case” in the transferor court on remand clearly relates to MDL procedure but does not arise 
directly out of the MDL. See, e.g., Howard v. Zimmer, Inc., 711 F.3d 1148 (10th Cir. 2012). 
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two opinions involving settlement, holding that it did not have jurisdiction 
to review objections to a preliminary approval of the settlement class.154 The 
Eighth Circuit has heard several cases emerging from the genetically 
modified rice MDL, holding in one case that the transferee court has broad 
discretion to oversee the distribution of the common benefit fund, but not 
to order parties in cases not consolidated into the MDL to pay into the 
fund,155 and in another case holding that federal district courts have 
jurisdiction to require parties to contribute to the CBF, even if the actual 
settlement occurs in state court.156 Several cases reviewed MDL choice of 
law decisions.157 
The remaining cases on appeal (apart from these procedure-related appeals), 
involved ordinary substantive questions that just happened to arise in 
MDLs—such as federal preemption of state claims and other statutory 
questions—or questions about class certification for classes within the MDL, or 
questions involving motions to compel arbitration. Figure 1 provides a snapshot. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
154 In re Nat’l Football League Players Concussion Injury Litig., 775 F.3d 570 (3d Cir. 
2014); In re Nat’l Football League Players Concussion Injury Litig., 821 F.3d 410 (3d Cir. 2016). 
155 In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 764 F.3d 864 (8th Cir. 2014). 
156 In re Genetically Modified Rice Litig., 835 F.3d 822 (8th Cir. 2016). In a related case—not 
included in this survey because it arose collaterally to the MDL itself—the Eighth Circuit 
considered a class action brought by lead counsel against other attorneys in the MDL for failing 
to pay into the CBF. The appellate court found that the district with the MDL court had 
personal jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ attorneys who initially filed the rice complaints in state 
court in another district. See Downing v. Goldman Phipps, PLLC, 764 F.3d 906 (8th Cir. 2014). 
157 See, e.g., Wahl v. Gen. Elec. Co., 786 F.3d 491 (6th Cir. 2015). 
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Figure 1: MDL Procedural Issues on Appeal, 2011–2016
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Nevertheless, the courts of appeals, at least in these cases, do not seem to 
be in the business of “making MDL procedure.” Although the very 
existence of these appellate decisions undercuts charges that MDLs are a 
doctrinal black hole and that access to an appellate court is impossible, very 
few of the cases decided actually seem to address any of the issues most 
troubling to those who worry about MDLs. This may well be because the 
cases are still coming up under § 1291, which would not generally be used 
to review the creative early-stage claim management decisions. As a result, 
the core of the work that captures the MDL’s unique features and 
unorthodoxies still seems largely absent from the appellate docket. 
CONCLUSION: UNORTHODOX CIVIL PROCEDURE 
The MDL is perhaps the most salient modern example of what this Article 
calls unorthodox civil procedure. Unorthodox does not necessarily mean “bad.” 
But the emergence of unorthodox lawmaking often does signify a system under 
stress, or in the process of change. Indeed, just as the rise of non-traditional 
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omnibus legislation is a symptom of the bigger problems of legislative gridlock 
and overwhelming regulatory complexity, the rise of the MDL may be a sign 
of deeper pressures on the traditional model of procedure. MDLs demand that 
we pay attention to the nationalization of litigation, the limits of the FRCP, 
and the real-world challenges of access to court under the traditional model. 
MDLs are certainly not the only example of unorthodox civil procedure, but 
with thirty-nine percent of the federal docket, they are certainly warranting of 
more theoretical and doctrinal analysis. Moreover, additional unorthodoxies are 
likely not far behind. Just as in the legislative and administrative law contexts, the 
rise of one unorthodox vehicle is usually the beginning, not the end, of the trend. 
